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Article 8

Post-Election Legal Strategy in Florida: The
Anatomy of Defeat and Victory
Steve Bickerstaff *

I.

INTRODUCTION

With the passage of time since the abrupt end of the 2000 postelection legal battle in the Florida presidential election, several research
groups I have examined categories of uncounted or disputed ballots and
reported their findings. 2 These findings show that the post-election
battle was Al Gore's battle to win. The final certified totals on
November 26, 2000, gave George W. Bush a winning margin of 537
votes out of approximately six million. 3 This miniscule lead could have
been eclipsed by Gore, either during the recount or the election contest
stage of the post-election period, if the Gore legal team's strategies had
been successful.

* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. The author founded the firm of
Bickerstaff, Heath, Smiley, Pollan, Kever & McDaniel, L.L.P., in Austin, Texas. He has
practiced election law for more than twenty years and has represented clients in statewide
recounts in Texas.
1. The Florida Ballots Project was conceived and sponsored by the New York Times, the Wall
Street Journal, the Washington Post, Tribune Publishing (which includes the Chicago Tribune,
Los Angeles Times, and a number of other newspapers), CNN, the Associated Press, the St.
Petersburg Times, and the Palm Beach Post. This consortium engaged the National Opinion
Research Center at the University of Chicago ("NORC") to review and characterize uncertified
ballots from the presidential election in Florida. The results were released in early November
2001. Another consortium, including some of these same newspapers, earlier had released results
of a review of only undervote ballots.
2. NORC reviewed and characterized 175,010 uncertified ballots, including 113,820 overvote
ballots and 61,190 undervote ballots. Frequently Asked Questions, at NORC Florida Ballots
Project, available at http://www.norc.org/fl (last visited Nov. 19, 2002) [hereinafter NORC
Website]. The final product of the project is embodied in two primary data sets available at the
Center's website. Id. The project makes no conclusions about the outcome of the election and
allows newsgroups and other persons to utilize the databases to project results under different
recount scenarios.
3. The final certified results from Florida show Bush with 2,912,790 votes (48.80% of the
votes counted) and Gore with 2,912,253 votes (also 48.80% of the votes counted). Florida
Department of State, Elections Division, Official Results, at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/
elections/resultsarchive (last visited Nov. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Official Results]. The official
results also are available by county on the NORC Website, supra note 2.
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Gore could have prevailed under any of several different scenarios
that might have been achieved during the post-election legal battle. In
November 2001, The National Opinion Research Center ("NORC")
released the results of its review and characterization of 175,010 ballots
still officially classified as nonvotes in the presidential election in
Florida when Al Gore's election contest ended. The NORC results
show that Al Gore could have prevailed if all nonvote ballots (both
undervotes 4 and overvotes 5 ) statewide had been manually reviewed to
ascertain voter intent. Under a second scenario, Gore could have
prevailed if the punch card ballots treated as nonvotes by the canvassing
board of Palm Beach County during its manual recount had been
counted using the same inclusive standard that was used for the manual
review and hand-counting of ballots in neighboring Broward and Palm
Beach Counties. 6 Finally, Bush's victory depended on his margin in the
late-received overseas absentee ballots that were counted.
Bush
garnered 1575 (out of a total of 2411 cast for him and Gore) for a net
margin of 739 votes.7 Some writers, however, have suggested that
significant illegal votes were part of Bush's overseas absentee vote
total. 8 Nonetheless, Gore could have prevailed if more late-received
absentee ballots had been counted in heavily Democratic counties or if
the Gore legal team had successfully opposed the counting of ballots in
Florida's heavily Republican counties.
Significantly, the NORC review shows that, in the absence of a
change in results from either the manual recount in Palm Beach County
or the count of overseas absentee ballots in Gore's favor, Gore was
unlikely to have prevailed 9 in the election with either the manual review
4. An undervote ballot is one on which the voter did not select a candidate for president or the
electronic counting machine failed to register a vote for any candidate in the presidential election.
FrequentlyAsked Questions, at NORC Website, supra note 2.
5. An overvote ballot is one on which an electronic counting machine registers two or more
votes in the presidential election. Id.
6. The canvassing board of Broward County (and the canvassing board of Miami-Dade
County for its partially completed recount) reviewed undervote punch card ballots using the socalled "dimpled ballot" standard. Under this standard, the canvassing board could conclude that a
voter intended to cast a vote for a particular candidate even if the proper chad on the ballot for
that candidate was only indented rather than fully detached. By contrast, the canvassing board of
Palm Beach County agreed not to count any ballot unless the appropriate chad for a candidate
was actually detached (i.e., the "hanging chad" standard).
7. Official Results, supra note 3.
8. See David Barstow & Dan Van Natta, Jr., How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas
Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 1, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New
York Times File (describing how Republican lawyers were successful in adding possibly illegal
overseas absentee votes to the county election returns).
9. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, Who Won Florida? The Answer Emerges, but Surely Not the
Final Word, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A16, availableat LEXIS, News Library, The New
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and counting of undervote ballots in Miami-Dade County, as sought in

Gore's election contest, 10 or with the manual review and counting of
undervote ballots statewide as mandated by the Florida Supreme Court
on December 8, 2000, in Gore v. Harris.1 1 According to the NORC
review, a potential margin of victory for Gore lay in the statewide
counting of the thousands of ballots rejected by electronic counting
machines as overvotes, which, on manual review, were found to contain
votes in fact lawful under Florida law. 12 Gore's legal team not only
never sought to have these overvotes manually reviewed and counted
statewide but, instead, vigorously opposed any statewide hand-counting
of overvotes, even as the legal battle ended on December 12.13
York Times File; Joel Engelhardt & Elliot Jaspin, Under the Two Most Likely Scenarios, Bush
Won Recounts, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 12, 2001, at lAA, available at 2001 WL 29213042;
Ford Fessenden & John M. Broder, Study of Disputed Florida Ballots Finds Justices Did Not
Cast the Deciding Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at Al, availableat LEXIS, News Library,
The New York Times File; John F. Harris, A Symbolic, but Muddled, Victory, WASH. POST, Nov.
12, 2001, at All, available at 2001 WL 29761941; If the U.S. Supreme Court Hadn't Said
Stop... George Bush Would Still Be President Ballot Review Indicates Over-Votes Cost Gore
the Election, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 12, 2001, § A, at 1, available at 2001 WL 29214001;
Gary Kane, But More Marked Ballots For Gore, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 12, 2001, at IAA,
available at 2001 WL 29213043; Dan Keating & Dan Balz, Florida Recounts Would Have
FavoredBush, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2001, at Al, availableat 2001 WL 29762038.
10. Compl. to Contest Election, Gore v. Harris, No. CV-00-2808 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000),
available at http://199.44.225.4/courtDockets/pdf/election-cases/CV-00-2808a.pdf (last visited
Nov. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Compl. to Contest Election]. As discussed more fully below, Gore's
election contest petition also complained that the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board had
applied an incorrect standard during its manual review of ballots and that, as a result, the board
had left approximately 4000 ballots (e.g., ones with dimpled chads) with votes uncounted. The
petition predicted that the uncounted ballots represented approximately 800 additional net votes
for Gore. Id. However, the Florida Supreme Court found on December 8 that Gore had not
presented any evidence that these ballots (now counted as 3300 ballots) were valid votes and
upheld the circuit court's rejection of this claim. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla.)
(per curiam), rev'dper curiam sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
11. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). This opinion actually is ambiguous as to whether the majority of the
Florida Supreme Court anticipated that the recount of votes by the circuit court would include
overvotes as well as undervotes. At various places, the Court majority opinion focuses on only
uncounted undervotes (e.g., "[T]he circuit court has jurisdiction ... in all counties that have not
conducted a manual recount or tabulation of undervotes in this election to do so forthwith." Id. at
1262 (per curiam)). At others the opinion suggests the possibility of a broader recount (e.g., "The
circuit court is directed to enter such orders as are necessary to add any legal votes to the total
statewide." Id. (per curiam)). However, the Gore legal team apparently never officially adopted
this broader view of the opinion and continued, even on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court and afterward, to oppose counting overvote ballots. See infra note 13 (discussing the
contents of Gore's brief).
12. NORC Website, supra note 2.
13. See JAKE TAPPER, DOWN AND DIRTY, THE PLOT TO STEAL THE PRESIDENCY app. at 49697 (2001) (proposed, but unfiled, Gore brief from December 13, 2000). A proposed, but unfiled,
brief for Gore argued that overvote ballots did not need to be included in a recount even after the
Supreme Court ruling in Bush v. Gore because the Supreme Court did not clearly mandate the

152

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

The outcome in Florida is a reminder that legal conflicts sometimes
are like military engagements, with the strategies, tactics and leadership
of the two combating forces ultimately determining a winner and a
loser. For shortly over a month, the legal teams representing George W.
Bush and Al Gore were arrayed against one another in Florida like two
armies fighting an unplanned, but violent, war. Each team had its own
hurriedly organized command structure and order of battle, with both

combat and supporting forces. For a time, engagements were fought
simultaneously on many different fronts, in different forums, and in
different geographical locales. 14 This Article examines the legal
strategies, tactics, and leadership that
ultimately determined the
15
outcome of that post-election legal fight.
In order to better appreciate the legal dilemmas faced by the two legal
teams in Florida, it is first important to understand the basic legal rules
of election recounts and contests. Many misconceptions about those
rules arose from the flood of media coverage that served to distort many
of the events in Florida. Some of these misconceptions have found their
recounting of such ballots and there is no legal obligation to include them. Id. The brief urged
that few overvote ballots would yield valid votes and that "[o]nly in the rarest instances could
these ballots be read as reflecting a single intent." Id. The NORC review of the uncounted
ballots statewide discovered that there were a significant number of overvote ballots on which the
voter's intent to select one candidate could be readily ascertained. See NORC Website, supra
note 2.
14. Such hurried, multi-forum legal battles are rare, but not unprecedented. The most
comparable experience of this attorney was in 1981-1982 when the State of Texas was defending
its congressional and state legislative plans simultaneously in approximately ten different state
and federal lawsuits and before the United States Department of Justice. See Upham v. Seamon,
456 U.S. 37 (1982) (consolidated cases challenging Texas congressional election districts);
Terrazas v. Clements, 537 F. Supp. 514 (N.D. Tex.) (three judge court) (consolidated cases
challenging Texas senate and representative election districts), stay denied, 456 U.S. 902 (1982);
Upham v. White, 639 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1982) (Republican challenge to Texas state senate
election districts under state constitution); Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1981)
(challenge to Texas state representative election districts under state constitution).
15. The factual descriptions utilized herein are taken either from one of the many books that
have been written about the presidential battle, the articles cited elsewhere in this article, or from
interviews conducted by this author with attorneys who participated on the Bush or Gore legal
teams in Florida. The books include: CORRESPONDENTS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES, 36 DAYS:
THE COMPLETE CHRONICLE OF THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CRISIS (2001); E.J. DIONNE
& WILLIAM KRISTOL, BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY (2001);
ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION (2001); MARTIN METZER, DEMOCRACY
HELD HOSTAGE (2001); JOHN NICHOLS, JEWS FOR BUCHANAN: DID You HEAR ABOUT THE
THEFT OF THE PRESIDENCY (2001); TAPPER, supra note 13; JEFFREY TOOBIN, Too CLOSE TO
CALL: THE THIRTY-SIX DAY BATTLE TO DECIDE THE 2000 ELECTION (2001); POLITICAL STAFF
OF THE WASHINGTON POST, DEADLOCK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA'S CLOSEST ELECTION
(2001). The sources generally agree on most accounts of the events, therefore, I have not
attempted to provide a citation for each factual statement. I have tried to avoid any depictions
from these books that seem to reflect a bias or opinion by the author. In those instances in which
I have relied upon an obviously opinionated account of an event I have cited to the source.

2002]

Post-Election Legal Strategy in Florida

way into the literature about the post-election battle in Florida and have
been perpetuated from one article or book to another. Therefore, Part II
of this Article attempts to clarify several of the most significant of these
misconceptions. 16 Part III of this Article examines various aspects of
the organization, leadership, and decision-making of the two warring
legal camps in an effort to better understand why, in a circumstance in
which either Bush or Gore could have been certified the winner of the
Florida presidential election and the Presidency of the United States,
Bush prevailed. 17
1I.

CLARIFYING MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE LAW OF ELECTION
RECOUNTS AND CONTESTS

A. Recounts Versus Election Contests
As the media reported events in Florida, it appeared that the manual
recounting of undervote ballots (with county canvassing board officials
photographed squinting at punch card ballots in an effort to discover
voter intent) in certain counties continued uninterrupted into an election
contest in which Gore asked Florida courts to allow the counties to
finish the incomplete recounts. In reality, however, a recount and an
election contest are two distinct processes with different purposes and
rules. 18 These differences were critical to the outcome in Florida.

16. See infra Part H (clarifying misconceptions about the law of election recounts and
contests).
17. See infra Part III (discussing the anatomy of a defeat).
18. For a summary of state election laws, see NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE ELECTION DIRS., 2001
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION SURVEY (2001) [hereinafter ELECTION ADMINISTRATION SURVEY]
(compiled by the Association after the 2000 election in response to events in the Florida election),
and individual state responses on which the survey is based. For an overview of the categories of
changes in election voting methods and laws and a description of a few of the election problems
nationwide since 2000, see Katherine Q. Seelye & David E. Rosenbaum, Election Officials Are
Braced For Big Problems at the Polls, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS,
News Library, The New York Times File. In October 2002, Congress enacted the Help America
Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
15301-15545), in response to some of the election difficulties encountered in Florida. The Act
includes requirements for: voter education and voting system changes to better enable voters to
correct their ballots; manual audit capability for all voting systems; the establishment by law of
an acceptable error rate for voting systems; greater accessibility for individuals with disabilities;
additional multilingual voting functionality in voting systems; computerized statewide voter
registration; voting absentee by military and overseas citizens; grants to states and localities to
implement the other requirements of the Act and to improve administration of elections; the
creation of an Election Assistance Commission as a national clearing house and resource for
information and procedures and as a source of voluntary guidelines; and the creation of additional
federal boards for developing standards and technical guidelines.
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A recount, generally, is an administrative process in which local
election officials attempt to identify and correct human and machine
errors that occur during the original tabulation of votes. 19 Under the

law of most states, a recount must be completed within a few days of
the election so that the recount total, if different from the original
tabulation, can be substituted for the original tabulation before the
outcome of the election is certified.20 The certification of the winner of
the election is based on the will of the voters as expressed in the number
of votes reported by local election officials to the entity responsible by
law for finally certifying the winner of the election. The certification is
a critical event, and once it occurs, the election as a practical and legal
matter is over-a winner has been determined.
An election contest is a separate proceeding in which a losing
candidate, or in some states a voter, challenges the certified outcome
of the election. 2 1 State laws vary nationwide regarding who has
jurisdiction in particular elections to consider an election contest. In
many circumstances, as in Florida for the presidential election, contests
are heard in state court.2 2 Courts historically, however, have not wanted
the task of overseeing election results or substituting their judgment for
the certified outcome of an election. 23 Therefore, in virtually every
state, the certified election result is presumed to be valid,2 4 and the
courts have erected significant barriers for anyone attempting
to challenge that result. Often, these barriers exist as threshold
requirements that must be overcome even before a court will assume
19. See Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1050 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (describing the purpose
of a manual recount as "detecting and correcting clerical or electronic tabulating errors"); Miller
v. County Comm'n, 539 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 2000) (indicating that a recount gives candidates the
opportunity (1) to observe the manner in which the recount is conducted, (2) to notify the
canvassing board of their intentions regarding requesting a recount in precincts not requested by
the candidate originally requesting the recount, and (3) to identify ballots that may be challenged
as irregular or illegal in an election contest).
20. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 102.166 (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
21. There is no common law right to challenge an election outcome. See Harless v.
Lockwood, 332 P.2d 887, 888 (Ariz. 1958); McPherson v. Flynn, 397 So. 2d 665, 668 (Fla.
1981); Henderson v. Maley, 806 P.2d 626, 634 (Okla. 1991). The right exists only by virtue of,
and is strictly limited by, statute.
22. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102.168 (2000); ELECTION ADMINISTRATION SURVEY, supra note 18.
23. These concerns of the state judiciaries are similar to the concerns underlying the basic
political question doctrine of justiciability as explained in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See McIntyre v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1087-88 (7th Cir. 1985) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., Gooch v. Hendrix, 851 P.2d 1321, 1327 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Wilks v. Mouton,
722 P.2d 187, 189 (Cal. 1986)) ("[A] primary principle of law as applied to election contests is
that it is the duty of the court to validate the election if possible. That is to say, the election must
be held valid unless plainly illegal."); Swift v. Registrars of Voters, 183 N.E. 727, 728 (Mass.
1932).

2002]

Post-Election Legal Strategy in Florida

jurisdiction of the contest. Chief among such barriers are requirements
for specificity in pleading and for showing that substantial irregularities
or violations of state law have affected the outcome in the election.
Fishing expeditions, or lawsuits based on a hope that an outcome may
change, have historically been disallowed.25 By thus limiting access to
the judicial process, state courts historically have attempted to severely
limit the frequency with which courts will decide elections and to
forestall protracted legal proceedings that, merely by their pendency,
could affect the ability of the certified
winner of an election to
26
office.
in
duties
her
out
carry
effectively
Applicable election contest law in Florida is generally consistent with
other state laws nationwide. 2 7 The nearness of the two presidential
25. See, e.g., Christenson v. Allen, 119 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1963) (refusing to allow
election contest as a "fishing expedition"); Jackson v. Maley, 806 P.2d 610, 615 (Okla. 1991)
("[Clourts indulge every presumption in favor of the validity of an election and, where possible,
the validity will be sustained.... Mere possibilities will not suffice to carry this initial burden.");
In re Opening of Ballot Boxes, 718 A.2d 774, 777 (Pa. 1998) (recount invalidated because of lack
of verification of signatures on recount petition); Pfuhl v. Coopersmith, 253 A.2d 271, 275 (Pa.
1969) (indicating that a showing that a partial recount of precincts discloses possible errors in
other precincts is insufficient to obtain a recount of the other precincts in a state senate election).
26. See, e.g., In re Contest of the Election for the Offices of Governor and Lieutenant
Governor Held at the Gen. Election on Nov. 2, 1982, 444 N.E.2d 170, 178 (I11.1983).
27. In his dissent in Gore v. Harris,Chief Justice Wells explained that "[h]istorically, [the
Florida Supreme] Court has only been involved in elections when there have been substantial
allegations of fraud and then only upon a high threshold because of the chill that a hovering
judicial involvement can put on elections." Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1264 (Fla.) (Wells,
C.J., dissenting), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see, e.g., Smith v.
Tynes, 412 So. 2d 925, 926-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (indicating that it is not enough for a
contestant to show a reasonable possibility that election results could be altered by irregularities,
rather a reasonableprobabilitythat the results would have been changed must be shown). This
threshold of "reasonable probability" was created by the Florida courts and did not appear
explicitly in the election statutes. See Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d
840, 844-45 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 268 n.5 (Fla. 1975), for
the proposition that "[i]t is certainly the intent of the constitution and the legislature that the
results of elections are to be efficiently, honestly and promptly ascertained by election officials to
whom some latitude of judgment is accorded, and that courts are to overturn such determinations
only for compelling reasons when there are clear, substantial departures from essential
requirements of law"); Boardman, 323 So. 2d at 268 (indicating that where the record does not
show that votes were illegal "the presumption of the correctness of the election officials' returns
stands"). In Gore v. Harris, the majority of the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the
"reasonable probability" standard was no longer applicable under section 102.168 as amended in
1999. Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1255 (per curiam). Dissenting Justices Harding and Shaw agreed with
the majority that the reasonable probability requirement had not survived the 1999 amendments.
Id. at 1271 (Harding, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, these two Justices concluded that section
102.168 still required a contestant to show "that the number of legal votes rejected by the
canvassing boards is sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of this statewide election"
and that Gore had failed to carry this burden. Id. (Harding, J., dissenting). Even the majority
found that Gore had failed to carry his burden of showing that the 3300 ballots from Palm Beach
County were valid votes. Id. at 1260 (per curiam). In 2000, this threshold showing for an
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candidates (1784 votes separating the candidates out of approximately
six million votes cast) on November 8, 2000, triggered an automatic
recount of votes statewide in Florida. In most counties, election
officials merely recounted using the same counting equipment and
procedures as used on election night. Nevertheless, errors were found
and the differences between the two candidates unofficially narrowed to
a mere 327 votes, with late-received overseas absentee ballots
remaining to be counted.
With the election essentially a statistical tie, the Gore team on
November 8 or 9 made its first important strategic decision. The
decision had two parts. The first part concerned whether Gore should
request a further recount of ballots or allow the outcome of the election
to become final with Bush the winner. 28 The second part of the
decision concerned whether, if a further recount was to be requested, it
should be requested in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties or only in
selected ones. Gore's fateful decision was to request a manual
recounting of the ballots only in the four populous south Florida
counties (Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia) in which
the already counted votes had shown a majority for Gore. As provided
for by state law, the four counties initially conducted a partial manual
count of 1% of the county's precincts to determine whether a full
manual recount was justified. 29 Eventually, the canvassing board in
each of the four counties voted to conduct a full countywide manual
recount.
Local canvassing boards had one week, until November 14, to
officially report county voting results to the state canvassing board
headed by Secretary of State 31
Katherine Harris. 30 In Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board v. Harris, the Florida Supreme Court extended this
deadline to 5:00 p.m. on November 26.32 Despite this extension,
however, neither Palm Beach County nor Miami-Dade County
completed a manual recount of undervote ballots in time to report the
results to the Secretary of State by the new deadline. On November 26,
election contest in Florida was the basis for dismissing several challenges to the presidential
election. See infra note 35 (discussing the threshold requirements for an election contest).
28. Florida Attorney General Bob Butterworth journeyed to Tallahassee on November 8 to
persuade the leadership of the Gore legal team that a recount could win the election for Gore.
Interview with Ben Kuehne, Al Gore attorney, in Miami, Fla. (May 24, 2002).
29. FLA. STAT. ch. 102.166 (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
30. Id. ch. 102.112 (2000).
31. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.) (per curiam),
vacated per curiam sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000)
[hereinafter Palm Beach County CanvassingBd. I].
32. Id. at 1240 (per curiam).
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George W. Bush was certified the winner of the presidential race in
Florida with 2,912,790 votes compared
to 2,912,253 votes for Al
33
votes.
537
of
difference
Gore-a
Having been unable to overcome Bush's lead through the
administrative recounts, Gore contested the certified outcome of the
election. Gore's election contest complaint was filed on November 27.
It was this election contest litigation that proceeded on an expedited
basis through the Florida courts, and it was the order of the Florida
Supreme Court in this litigation that became the basis on which the
United States Supreme Court brought the post-election battle to a close
34
on December 12 in Bush v. Gore.
The important distinctions between an administrative recount and an
election contest under Florida law created dilemmas for the Gore legal
team and led it to make several decisions that were critical to the
eventual outcome in Florida. First, the Gore legal team faced a crucial
choice on November 13, 2000, when it became clear that the manual
recounts would not be completed by the statutory deadline of November
14. Gore could have either asked the Florida courts to enjoin
certification of the result of the election as planned on November 16
(thereby extending the period for completion of the ongoing manual
recounts), or he could have allowed the election results to be certified
on November 16 with Bush as the winner and promptly challenge this
result in an election contest. The Gore legal team decided to seek an
extenson of time for the completion of the administrative recounts.
A second dilemma for the Gore legal team arose in regard to whether
to challenge the presidential election result in Florida on the basis of the
butterfly ballot in Palm Beach County. The Gore legal team opted
against directly making such a challenge because the threshold
requirements applicable to such a lawsuit, and the difficulty of
remedying the harm caused by the butterfly ballot, made it unlikely that
such litigation could be successful.3 5
33. Official Results, supra note 3; see supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting that the
final certified results from Florida showed Bush with 2,912,790 votes and Gore with 2,912,253
votes).
34. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
35. The threshold requirements applicable to an election contest proved too great for several
lawsuits filed to challenge perceived irregularities in the Florida presidential election. See, e.g.,
Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam)
(concluding as a matter of law that the Palm Beach County butterfly ballot did not constitute
substantial noncompliance with statutory requirements); Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing
Bd., No. CV-00-2850, 2000 WL 1793409 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (rejecting a challenge to absentee
balloting in Martin County despite irregularities because the election in Martin County was a full
and fair expression of the will of the people), affd, 773 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2000); Jacobs v.
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A third dilemma was faced upon the filing of the election contest
itself. Gore's strategy during the recount had been to obtain manual
recounts in only four counties. The dilemma in the election contest was
whether a request for completion in court of these limited manual
recounts would be sufficient to meet the threshold requirements of an
election contest.
Election recount and contest law is arcane. It appears that the
leadership of the Gore legal team made some of its fateful decisions
without sufficient understanding of some aspects of that law.
B. The Hand-Countingof Ballots
As canvassing boards began a manual review and hand-counting of
ballots in the four Florida counties, interested onlookers perceived that
such hand-counting of ballots allowed partisan bias to prevail over the
supposed objectivity of the counting machines. Republicans suggested
that hand-counting was a subterfuge by which Gore was stealing the
election.
Contrary to the Republicans' post-election public posturing in
Florida, hand-counting ballots is the preferred manner nationwide for
determining the correct outcome in extremely close elections.16 The
events in Florida are unlikely to change that preference for voting
37
systems in which such counts are possible.
A manual or hand-counting of ballots on election night is neither
reliable nor efficient. Hand-counting hundreds or thousands of ballots,
each with votes for candidates in many different races, creates an
unacceptable margin of error and the possibility of wide scale fraud. In
addition, such a hand-counting is likely to take days to complete in this
nation's large jurisdictions at a time when the public has come to expect

Seminole County Canvassing Bd., No. CV-00-2816, 2000 WL 1793429 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (rejecting a
challenge to absentee balloting in Seminole County on the basis that plaintiffs' evidence failed to
support a finding of fraud, gross negligence, or intentional wrongdoing by election officials),
aff'd, 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000); Order of Dismissal at 1-2, Brown v. Stafford, CV-00-2878
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 2001), available at http://l199.44.225.4/courtDockets/pdf/electioncases/
CV-00-2878h.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Order of Dismissal] (dismissing
contest of election irregularities in Duval County in the presidential election).
36.

See ELECTION ADMINISTRATION SURVEY, supra note 18.

37. Most standalone self-tabulating voting machines, such as direct recording equipment
("DRE") and levered machines, do not leave a paper trail by which the results shown on the
machine may be manually checked to discern an individual voter's intent. However, under
recently enacted federal legislation these voting systems now are required to produce a permanent
paper record that will allow at least some audit capacity and record for recounts. See Help
America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 301(a)(2), 116 Stat. 1666, 1705 (2002) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545).
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election returns being reported within a few hours of the close of the
polling stations.
Properly programmed counting machines are quicker and less prone
to error than human counters. Therefore, each sizeable community or
jurisdiction in this country uses self-tabulating voting equipment, such
as direct recording equipment ("DRE") or levered voting machines, or
uses punch cards or paper ballots that can be electronically counted.
For virtually all elections, the use of electronic counting equipment is
satisfactory for determining the winner of an election. Nevertheless,
every manner of voting machine or electronic counting system is
susceptible to error.3 8 Some machine-counted ballots clearly indicating
a voter's intent to cast a vote for a particular candidate are erroneously
left uncounted by the counting equipment. In those rare instances in
which these uncounted ballots may be determinative of the winner of an
election, the manual review and hand-counting of the uncounted ballots
are the best means of accurately determining the outcome of the
election.
Manually reviewing and hand-counting ballots in a recount situation
is far different than hand-counting ballots on election night. The
manual recount occurs under highly controlled circumstances. Unlike
on election night, there usually is only one race at stake and, therefore,
only one vote to be determined per ballot. Teams of observers manually
review each ballot at issue. 39 Each such team includes election officials
and a representative of each affected candidate. 40 As a result, each
candidate's representative is in a position to observe and to identify any
practices that she considers irregular and to object to any ballots that she
believes have been improperly included or excluded from the vote
count. Through this process, the team of observers identify individual
disputed ballots that may be challenged before the canvassing board
and, if necessary, subsequently in an election contest.
Additional observations are useful for understanding the fairness of a
hand-counting of ballots. First, such hand-counts rarely change the
outcome of an election. The uncounted votes can be expected to
38. See RoY G. SALTMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L BUREAU OF STANDARDS, INST.
FOR COMPUTER SCI. & TECH., SPECIAL PUBLICATION 500-158: ACCURACY, INTEGRITY AND
SECURITY IN COMPUTERIZED VOTE-TALLYING (1988), available at http://www.itl.nist.govlab/

specpubs/500-158.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2002). Under recently enacted federal legislation, an
acceptable error rate standard is established by law for voting systems. See Help America Vote
Act of 2002 § 301(a)(5).
39. FLA. STAT. ch. 102.166 (2000 & West Supp. 2003). If ballots on which the counting
equipment has recorded no vote have been segregated from the counted ballots, the manual
review may (if permitted by state law) be limited to these nonvote ballots.
40. Id.
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usually break in approximately the same percentages as the votes
already counted so long as the standard in question is being applied
uniformly to all ballots (i.e., similarly appearing ballots must be treated
in a similar fashion for both candidates). Despite the Republicans'
public claims that canvassing boards in Florida were allocating votes
during the manual recount based on partisanship, the results of those
manual recounts in Volusia, Broward, Palm Beach and Miami-Dade
Counties suggest otherwise.
A second important observation is that any decision by a canvassing
board in Florida or most other states in a manual recount to include or to
exclude specific ballots is subject to challenge de novo in an election
contest. 4 1 The issue before a court or other body hearing the election
contest is whether the disputed ballot is a legal vote under state law, not
whether the canvassing board acted reasonably in including or
excluding the ballot. Therefore, if the outcome of an election is
determined by a canvassing board's apparent inclusion of illegal votes
or exclusion of legal votes, the outcome may be challenged in an
election contest.
C. The Standard of Voter Intent
As the manual recount of ballots proceeded in the four Florida
counties, county canvassing board officials often were shown on
national television squinting at punch card ballots in what sometimes
was portrayed or perceived as a partisan search for votes for one
candidate or another based on a subjective and standardless search for
"voter intent." Ascertainment of voter intent is the guiding principle
throughout virtually the entire country in any manual review of ballots.
Neither the events in Florida nor the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore4 2 are likely to change the acceptance of
that principle.
Many states by administrative rule or state law long ago established
rules or guidelines that are to be followed in ascertaining the intent of a
41. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1271 (Fla.) (Harding, J., dissenting) (indicating that
the issue of whether a canvassing board has rejected a number of legal votes is sufficient to
change or to place in doubt the election by virtue of cutting short a manual recount is to be
determined de novo, not under an abuse of discretion standard), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also McIntyre v. Wick, 558 N.W.2d 347, 358 (S.D. 1996)
(describing the scope of review in an election contest as de novo). The majority adopted this

same position.
42. The Court's per curiam opinion observed that the standard of ascertaining the intent of the
voter is "unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and a starting principle. The problem inheres
in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal application." Bush, 531 U.S. at 105-06
(per curiam).
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voter on a ballot that, for some reason, cannot be read by the electronic
counting equipment. 43 Nevertheless, even when such guidelines exist,
the ultimate standard often remains a subjective ascertainment of the
intent of the voter. For example, the law of Texas was identified during
the Florida recount as an example of state law prescribing specific
standards for manually counting punch card ballots. 44 Section 127.130
of the Texas Election Code purports to specifically limit circumstances
in which a ballot may be counted, such as when at least two comers of a
chad are detached. 4 5 This section of the Texas Election Code, however,
goes on to override these specific guidelines by expressly providing that
nothing in the section supercedes "any clearly ascertainable intent of the
46
voter."
Even when authorities agree on what specific guidelines are
applicable, reasonable persons may disagree about how those guidelines
apply to a particular ballot. Judges that agree on the legal standard to be
applied may disagree as to the result when that standard is applied to a
specific ballot. 4 7 In its review of the uncounted ballots in Florida,
NORC found that coders often disagreed in good faith about whether
particular ballots met the specific guidelines being applied for
48
characterizing a ballot.
Subjective judgments by humans are unavoidable in the manual
review and counting of ballots. Just as different umpires in baseball call
balls and strikes differently at the extremes of the prescribed strike
zone, different judicial and administrative officials in a hand-counting
of ballots may include or exclude votes differently, even when such
decisions are subject to controlling guidelines. These differences,
however, do not necessarily reflect a partisan bias or effort to aid in the
election of a preferred candidate.

43. See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 127.130 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 2003); see generally
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION SURVEY, supra note 18. Federal law now requires states to adopt a
uniform definition of what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote for each certified
voting system. See Help America Vote Act of 2002 § 301 (a)(6).
44. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 127.130 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 2003).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. For example, in Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241, 1243 n.2 (Mass. 1996), the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts found that the judge of the trial court had applied the correct
standard for discerning voter intent but that "[o]n balance, we are slightly more willing to find
intention expressed on [the] ballots where the trial judge ruled there was none." See Duffy v.
Mortenson, 497 N.W.2d 437, 439-40 (S.D. 1993) (concluding that a ballot with an indented chad
not counted by the trial court provided evidence of clear voter intent and, when counted, resulted
in a tie between the candidates).
48. See NORC Website, supra note 2.
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D. A Single ImpartialArbiter
If, as suggested above, manual recounts remain an accepted means
for resolving close elections and the inevitable goal in such a recount is
ascertaining voter intent, how can candidates and voters be assured
fairness and uniformity in the ascertainment of that intent? Historically,
fundamental fairness in an election has been guarded through the
opportunity for fair adjudication of all disputes before a single impartial
arbiter. 49 Depending on the office at stake and the applicable state law,
this prescribed arbiter may be the courts, a state legislature, Congress,
or a state official. Importantly, this arbiter's review is de novo.
The arbiter determines the legality of a disputed vote independent of
any determination reached by a canvassing board. This opportunity for
fair adjudication before an impartial arbiter is crucial. For example,
Florida's General Election Statute contemplates the opportunity for
such adjudication when necessary in election disputes through an
election contest in state court. 50 In 2000, however, the reality was that
there was never sufficient time for a full and fair adjudication of the
myriad of issues and categories of legal or illegal votes possibly
of the outcome of the extremely close presidential
determinative
51
election.
E. A Remedy ForEvery Injury
Some commentators have expressed outrage at the action of the
United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore at least in part because of
a view that the law should provide a remedy for every injury. As
discussed below, however, such an absolute view is contrary to state
and federal rulings in the area of election law. 52 Alleged and even
49. In his dissenting opinion in Bush v. Gore, Justice Stevens indicated that the traditional
safeguard for election contests nationwide existed even under the Florida Court's remedial order
-i.e., "a single impartial magistrate [that] will ultimately adjudicate all objections arising from
the recount process." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 126 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. FLA. STAT. ch. 102.168 (2000).
51. In its anxious attempt to count as many votes as possible, the majority of the Florida
Supreme Court on December 8, 2000, lost sight of the essential need for preserving the
fundamental fairness of the election outcome by assuring that an impartial arbiter could uniformly
determine the validity of all disputed and uncounted ballots from throughout the state. The court
required that the recount totals from Palm Beach and Miami-Dade (and effectively from Broward
and Volusia) Counties be included in the final tally of votes even though the recount standards
and ballots in both counties were disputed. It also allowed other votes to be included or excluded
based on disparate local standards. The majority effected a fundamentally unfair result that
appeared to deny any opportunity for adjudication of these disputed issues before an impartial

arbiter.
52. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (discussing various state and federal rulings
on election contests and recounts).
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proven injuries sometimes are left without remedy, especially when the
or the remedy for that
court perceives that a search for a specific injury
53
injury could be more harmful than productive.
First, no court has found that "every vote must be counted. 5 4 In the
reality of elections involving possibly millions of ballots, votes in an
election are seldom fully and accurately counted because every method
of counting votes has some margin of error. Most elections, however,
are not nearly close enough to fall within this margin of error. Even in a
close election, the purpose of a recount or election contest
is to
55
determine the will of the voters, not an exact total of votes.
Second, even when the outcome of an election is at issue,
circumstances such as a shortage of time sometimes prevent prosecution
of a complaint. The process and result in Florida was affected by the
extreme shortage of time in which to resolve the dispute over the
electors in the presidential election. A presidential election, however, is
not the only election in which a lack of time affects the ability to
determine the winner with certainty. For example, close party primary
elections sometimes end with the final results somewhat in doubt
because there is not sufficient time to fully litigate the disputed votes or
issues in time for the candidate to qualify for a run-off or for the general
election. As a result, the certified results are left to stand without
litigation, with the losing candidate sometimes left with the feeling that
perhaps she really won.
Third, in close elections unaffected by fraud, the courts in this
country historically have placed a greater emphasis on maintaining the
continuity of government than on encouraging the protracted litigation
53. An important aspect of our democracy is that power in government can readily transfer in
confidence that, at the end of the term of office, it will again transfer if the election outcome is
different. No outcome of any single primary or general election is sufficiently important to
warrant significant disruption of the governing process, even in the interest of assuring the
accuracy of the election outcome. There must be finality. The candidates, but more importantly
the government and the people, must move on. See McIntyre v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1088 (7th Cir.
1985) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (indicating that our government is a representative democracy and
that the people cannot be properly represented unless the legitimacy and authority of the elected
official to represent them is finally determined).
54. This phrase became the rallying cry for Democrats during the post-election battle in
Florida.
55. See, e.g., In re Election of the United States Representatives, 653 A.2d 79, 90-91 (Conn.
1994) ("[T]he purpose of the voting process is to ascertain the intent of the voters."); Boardman
v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 265 (Fla. 1975) (indicating that a "fundamental inquiry should be
whether or not the irregularity complained of has prevented a full, fair and free expression of the
people's will"); Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 611 (111. 1990) ("The purpose of our election
laws is to obtain a correct expression of the intent of the voters."); Moore v. Hayes, 744 P.2d 934,
941 (Okla. 1987) ("The primary concern of an election recount, whether conducted by hand or by
machine, is to find the will of the voters, as truly and faithfully as possible.").
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of questionable candidate claims over disputed ballots. This balancing
in favor of "finality" seems to reflect several principles that go to the
strength of our democracy, such as: (1) in the absence of credible
allegations of fraud or significant irregularities that can be shown to
have denied the will of the people, the certified election outcome should
be presumed valid and should remain undisturbed; 56 (2) greater harm
may be done to a democracy by allowing protracted litigation over and
court interference with elections than by the possibility that sometimes
the declared outcome in an extremely close election may actually be
statistically incorrect; 57 and (3) the power of government can readily be
transferred in our democracy in confidence that, at the end of the term
of office, it will again transfer if the election outcome is different.
Finally, federal courts have long recognized that a remedy will be
withheld in election lawsuits even under an unlawful election system
when justified by "exigent circumstances." In its landmark decision,
Reynolds v. Sims, 58 the United States Supreme Court explained that
federal courts may be bound to award or to withhold relief based on the
mechanics and complexities of state election laws. 59 This principle has
been applied many times since 1964,60 even though the unavoidable
effect is to allow persons to serve in office who otherwise probably
would not have been elected.
Regardless whether an observer agrees with the United States
Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore, the decision is not the first in
an election case
to deny the opportunity for a judicial remedy for an
61
alleged wrong.

56. See supra note 25 (discussing the Court's preference for a presumption of validity).
57. See In re Contest of the Election for the Offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor
Held at the Gen. Election on Nov. 2, 1982, 444 N.E.2d 170, 178 (I11. 1983) (concluding that the
political turmoil surrounding an unresolved election contest effectively could "prevent the
legislative and executive branches of government from dealing with the urgent problems facing
[a] State. [A] State ... should not be forced to endure these consequences on the mere suspicion
of defeated candidates or on their belief or hope that an election contest would change the

results.").
58. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
59. Id. at 585-87.
60. See, e.g., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 44 (1982); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 114
(1971); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 121 (1967); Terrazas v. Clements, 537 F. Supp. 514, 537
(N.D. Tex.) (three judge panel), stay denied, 456 U.S. 902 (1982).
61. For example, on the same day as the Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore, Leon
County Circuit Judge Terry Lewis dismissed another contest of the November 2000 election on
the basis that "[t]he problem here is simply one of time and the resultant lack of due process that
could be afforded in resolving the issues raised by the Complaint in a meaningful way." Order of
Dismissal, supra note 35, at 1.
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III.

ANATOMY OF A DEFEAT

Many different factors affected the outcome in Florida. This portion
of this article examines a few examples of the strategies, tactics, and
leadership that helped determine the outcome.
A. The Organizationof the Bush and Gore Legal Teams
As opposing forces began to assemble in Florida after November 8,
the Democratic team of lawyers seemed to hold an advantage. As time
passed, however, the Bush legal team proved itself to be better
organized and more effective.
By four o'clock in the morning on November 8, the Gore team was
convened at the direction of campaign chairman William Daley62 in the
campaign's headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee. The team had the
benefit of some of the best political operatives available and some
important legal talent, including Ron Klain 63 and the experienced
recount law specialists Jack Young 64 and Chris Sautter.65 Former

62. William Daley spent much of his early legal career with the Chicago law firm of Mayer,
Brown & Platt. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 37. He served as Secretary of Commerce under
President Clinton. Id. In 2000, he became Gore's campaign manager, replacing Tony Coelho.
Id. From the beginning of the post-election battle, Daley thought that Gore's recount effort had
little chance of success. Id.
63. Ron Klain has extensive experience in advising candidates and elected officials on
political and legal issues. See id. at 10-11. Following a clerkship with Justice Byron White of
the United States Supreme Court, he worked as chief counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Id. at 10. With Clinton's presidential victory in 1992, Ron Klain became an associate White
House counsel and later served as Chief of Staff to Attorney General Janet Reno and Democratic
Senate leader Tom Daschle. Id. In 1995, he became Chief of Staff to Vice-President Al Gore.

Id. He left the White House in September 1999 to join the Washington law firm of O'Melveney
& Myers. Id. at 11. During 2000, he went to Nashville to help run the Gore campaign's
communications center. Id. He was thrust into the lead role in the post-election legal battle
despite knowing little about the actual casting and counting of votes or about election recounts or
contests. See id. Ron Klain worked exhaustively for his client and his dedication was absolute.

64. John Hardin Young has an office in Washington with the Democratic National
Committee's chief lawyer, Joe Sandier. See id. at 27-29, 38-39. He, Chris Sautter, and Timothy
Downs are co-authors of the book, The Recount Primer. Id. One of only a handful of attorneys
nationwide with significant recount experience, he was part of the Gore legal team from the
beginning and urged that Gore seek a statewide recount of ballots. Id. Young ended up spending
the post-election period primarily engaged first in the recount in Volusia County and then in
Broward and Miami-Dade Counties even though he continued to suggest that the search for
voters expand into other counties. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 184-85; TOOBIN, supra note
15, at 154.
65. Chris Sautter has an office in Washington, D.C., and provides consulting services to
Democratic candidates nationwide. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 68; TOOBIN, supra note 15, at
38. His recount experience dates back to 1984. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 38. Sautter coauthored The Recount Primer with Jack Young and Timothy Downs. Id. He was persistent but
unsuccessful in his effort to persuade the Gore legal team to initiate a recount statewide. Id.
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Secretary of State Warren Christopher 66 was awakened by a call from
Daley and agreed to fly to Nashville.
Shortly after sunrise on
November 8, a group of those who earlier had been meeting in
Nashville and other supporters left by private plane for Florida where, at
Klain's direction, they were spread among the sixty-seven Florida
counties. On arriving in Tallahassee, Klain and Democratic Party
General Counsel Joe Sadler immediately set out to find lawyers in
Florida. 6 7 By evening, both Daley and Christopher were in Tallahassee
and a core legal team was convened.
Therefore, within approximately twenty-four hours of the closing of
the polls in Florida, key members of the Gore legal team were already
assembled in Florida to plot their client's legal strategy.
By the
morning of November 9, the consensus of the Gore leadership was to
forego a legal challenge to the butterfly ballot in Palm Beach County
and, instead, to file protests in Volusia, Broward, Palm Beach and
Miami-Dade Counties designed to obtain a manual review and handcounting of ballots on which the counting machines had failed to record
a vote for president (i.e., "undervotes"). 69 The team's recount experts
70
dispersed to their assigned counties to file the necessary "protests"
and to prosecute the requested manual recounts before the county
canvassing boards and, as necessary, before the Florida courts. This
strategy of achieving a manual recount in these four counties remained
essentially unchanged during the next eventful few weeks.
The Republican legal team was slower to assemble and to organize.
On the morning of November 8, the Bush campaign contacted former

Sautter ended up spending the post-election period primarily engaged in the recount in Broward
County. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 208.

66. Warren Christopher has spent most of his legal career as a corporate litigator with the law
firm of O'Melveney & Myers. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 45-46. He has been an advisor to
many presidents and has served as Secretary of State. Id. He is characterized as cautious and
judicious. Id. at 45. Burdened by personal and professional obligations outside of Florida,
Christopher left Tallahassee on November 20. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 327; TOOB1N, supra

note 15, at 97.
67. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 33. Initially promising efforts by Klain to recruit Democratic
attorneys from the prestigious Florida firm of Holland & Knight were unsuccessful when the firm
partnership decided to sit out the conflict. Id.
68. See id. at 44. In anticipation of possible post-election recounts, Democrats had prepared a
notebook with the recount procedures of twenty states beforehand. Id.
69. See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood of successfully
challenging the butterfly ballot in light of recent unfavorable litigation).
70. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102.166 (2000) (amended 2001). In Florida, a request for a manual
recount of ballots comes in the form of a written "protest" filed with the county canvassing board.
Id.
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Secretary of State Jim Baker 71 as he returned home from the airport in
Houston, Texas. The Gore team had Warren Christopher; would Baker
represent Bush in Florida? Baker agreed to the task. The chief lawyer
on the Bush campaign with election recount experience was Ben
Ginsberg. 72 When the leaders of the Bush team convened at five
o'clock in the evening on November 8 in Tallahassee, Florida, Baker
was appalled at the "meager team that had been assembled" to fight
what he already sensed would be a demanding legal and public relations
fight. 73 The Bush team, however, enjoyed many advantages, including
having both their client and his brother (Jeb Bush) in governors'
mansions. Within days the legal team grew with the addition of
attorneys from premier law firms in Florida, Texas, and elsewhere in the
United States. 74 Baker's announced objective from the beginning was
to get the best attorneys.
As this throng of willing Republican attorneys gathered in Florida
and in offices elsewhere in the country at Jim Baker's request, they
were divided into teams with specific assignments and areas of
responsibility.7 5 The critical federal court team was organized under
Theodore Olsen and had the responsibility of developing and executing
a winning strategy for activity in the federal courts. A second group
was assigned state court litigation. At the personal initiative of
Governor Jeb Bush's general counsel on the day after the election,
Democratic Tallahassee attorney Barry Richard had been recruited to
Distrusted by some Republicans for his
help the Bush team.
Democratic past, Richard did not become the clear leader of Bush's
71. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 40. James A. Baker III has spent most of his legal career
with the Houston firm of Baker & Botts, which was founded by his great-grandfather. Id.
Characterized by one writer as "the leading political operative of his generation," Baker is
described as a close friend to former President Bush and intensely loyal to candidate George W.
Bush. Id. at 45-46. He is characterized as relentless and partisan. Id. One writer indicates that
Baker is a "ruthless CEO type," once labeled as "the velvet hammer." See TAPPER, supra note
13, at 50-54. Baker remained engaged in Florida as the nucleus of the Bush legal effort for
essentially all of the post-election legal battle. Id. at 238.
72. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 44-45. Ben Ginsberg is now with the Washington law firm
of Patton Boggs LLP. Id. He has served as counsel for various campaign committees and for the
Republican National Committee, Id. His experience extends to numerous election recounts. Id.
He was quick to lay out a Republican recount strategy for Florida. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at
46-47. Ginsberg remained in Florida for essentially the entire post-election legal battle, Id.
George Terwillinger later joined the Bush legal team as "a kind of chief operating officer of the
legal effort in Tallahassee." Id. at 50. Ginsberg is credited with telling Terwillinger to find a way
to get to federal court. Id. at 86.
73. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 46.
74. Id. at 49. For example, there were at least seventy-five participants in the Republicans'
legal-strategy conference call on November 9, 2000. Id.
75. Id. at 48-51.
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state litigation team until after Washington attorney, Michael Carvin,
received harsh treatment in oral argument before the Florida Supreme
Court. 76 A third team was assigned on November 9 to pursue the still
outstanding late-received, overseas absentee ballots. A fourth team was
assigned to oppose Gore's manual recount efforts. Most of the
attorneys in this fourth group headed to the four heavily Democratic
counties on which the Gore team had focused. Eager volunteers, who
flocked to Florida to help Bush win, augmented these teams of
attorneys. As time passed, Baker persuaded other skilled trial lawyers,
such as Irv Terrell of Houston, Phil Beck of Chicago, and
Fred Bartlit of
77
team.
legal
Bush
the
join
to
Florida
to
Chicago to come
Aside from the many attorneys engaged in the higher profile recounts
and lawsuits, another group of attorneys played a major role in Florida.
The Bush legal team enjoyed a significant operational advantage
because of a statewide network of primarily young, "true believer"
attorneys 78 from across Florida who were organized to communicate
almost daily with the legal team's Tallahassee headquarters about
developments in each of Florida's sixty-seven counties. This network
of local attorneys furnished the Bush legal team with timely, generally
reliable information about matters statewide, such as the number and
origin of late-received overseas absentee ballots and whether individual
county canvassing boards were applying a rigid or flexible standard
for counting late-received ballots attributable to overseas military
personnel. 7 9 This network proved particularly useful in the Bush team's
ongoing effort through December 12 to garner the maximum number of
late-received absentee votes.
Although one of Ron Klain's first instincts on reaching Florida was
to dispatch Gore volunteers across the state to determine the situation
within each county, the Gore team's statewide network proved over
time to be less effective than the Bush network. For example, Gore's
representatives were asked to provide Gore's command center with
information about the number and nature of overseas and absentee
76. See id. at 95-96, 135, 231-32.
77. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 293; see also KATY TERRELL, THE BATrLE OF THE
BALLOTS (May 3, 2002) (describing the background of Irv Terrell and his friendship and
professional confrontations with David Boies).
78. Interview with Jason Unger, George W. Bush attorney, in Tallahasse, Fla. (Feb. 1, 2002).
These attorneys largely came from the ranks of the pre-existing political organization "Lawyers

for Bush." Id.
79. Id.; see Barstow & Van Natta, supra note 8 (describing how Republican attorneys in each
county obtained a list of overseas voters who had requested an absentee ballot, determined the
political affiliation of each voter, and determined whether or not that voter's absentee ballot had
been received and counted by the county canvassing board).
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ballots in the various counties.
This information, however, was
received from only ten of the state's sixty-seven counties by November

17. The Republicans had received information much earlier on all of
the counties. Similarly, the Gore team apparently failed to timely
recognize that approximately 26,000 ballots (including approximately

9000 in primarily African-American precincts that had voted 90% for
Gore) had gone uncounted as invalid undervotes and overvotes in Duval
County 80 and that in Lake County there were over 3000 overvotes
81
representing a potential net gain for Gore of approximately 130 votes.
The Gore team's initial organizational advantage of having quickly
assembled an experienced team of lawyers in Florida and having
implemented a strategy of manually recounting votes in the four large
heavily Democratic counties became a disadvantage over time because

the team's focus remained fixed primarily on successfully fulfilling this
strategy. Other additional or alternative strategies or potential sources
of net votes for Gore or for Bush went largely ignored.
Further, it appears to have been a mistake to disperse the members of
the Gore team with election law experience among the individual
counties in which a manual recount had been requested. The Gore
command center in Tallahassee suffered from a lack of recount
expertise with which to advise the attorneys around the state or to assess
the significance of new information or changing circumstances
statewide. 82 The Gore team had been warned early on November 8 that

"[r]ecounts only succeed if you find out what happened.

'83

The Gore

team did not follow this maxim, at least insofar as it implies that success
required understanding
what had happened and was happening
84
Florida.
in
statewide

80. See Compl. to Contest Election at 7-9, Brown v. Stafford, No. 00-2878 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec.
12, 2000), available at http://199.44.225.4/courtDockets/pdf/election-cases/CV-00-2878- I.pdf
(last visited Nov. 28, 2002). The plaintiffs, including Congresswoman Corrine Brown, indicated
in their complaint that the supervisor of elections in Duval County was asked on November 9
about the number of "invalidated votes" but told the Gore campaign representative that "he did
not have those numbers available but that there were not many" when, in reality, "they numbered
in the tens of thousands ... and were larger by far than in previous elections." Id. Even once the
Gore legal team was aware of the number of overvotes in Duval County, it still chose not to
attempt to obtain a recount of votes in the county. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 184.
81. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 184-85 (describing the votes in Lake County and Jack
Young's futile effort to convince the Gore headquarters in Tallahassee to build on Gore's success
in Volusia County by expanding the search for votes to other optical scan counties).
82. The Democratic attorneys with recount experience had been dispatched to the four
counties where recounts were in progress.
83. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 29 (attributing this statement to attorney Jack Young).
84. The Gore team's lack of an effective statewide network left it without sufficient
information: (1) to timely predict by precinct and county the likely number of uncounted votes

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

B. Leadership of the Legal Teams
The leadership of the two legal teams proved to have very different
styles. These differences began with the clients themselves. George W.
Bush essentially delegated onsite decision-making authority to Jim
Baker as the leader of his legal team in Florida. 85 By contrast, Al Gore
remained actively involved throughout the post-election period in the
determination of legal86strategy and interested in the minutia of what was
happening in Florida.
Jim Baker and Ben Ginsberg have been characterized as relentless,
partisan, and farsighted. They apparently were perceived by the
members of the Bush legal team as loyally committed to achieving a
Bush victory at virtually any cost. These perceived characteristics of
this leadership team (including its essentially de facto decision-making
authority) appear to have allowed the leadership team to achieve better
discipline within the Bush legal team.
The Gore leadership team of Warren Christopher and Bill Daley has
87
been characterized as judicious, cautious, and generally passive.
Many Democrats are likely to disagree with writers who describe this
leadership team as having "hunkered down" at the Governor's Inn in
88
Tallahassee as the first stages of the legal battles erupted around them.
Nevertheless, it is clear that after November 11, when they ostensibly
made "a case for surrender" to Gore, Christopher 89 and Daley 9° became
less integral to the operation and decision-making of the Gore legal
team. Thereafter, much of the responsibility for ultimately leading the
Gore legal team in Florida rested with Ron Klain. While experienced as
an attorney and in elections, Klain had neither the political experience
statewide for Gore (particularly overvotes in counties in which a majority of counted votes were
for Bush); (2) to timely recognize and react to the growing significance statewide of Bush's effort
to obtain a counting of late-received absentee ballots (particularly from military personnel); or (3)
to assess the hostility of individual canvassing boards statewide.
85. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 53, 288.

86. TAPPER, supra note 13, at 198-299 (contrasting Gore's fixation on events in Miami-Dade
and Palm Beach Counties with Bush's "hands-off' attitude); TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 53-55,
199-202 (describing how Gore followed events closely and convened his top advisors in
Washington or by conference call to assess legal strategy).
87. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 51.
88. Id.

89. See id. at 97. Warren Christopher's age (75 years) may have affected his ability to remain
actively involved as the pace of the fight accelerated. Id.
90. Id. Bill Daley is reported to have had reservations about Gore's post-election efforts
almost from the beginning. Id. He is pictured as having a "sense of futility" about the effort and
as worrying about the "personal cost" to him and Gore from a prolonged or bitter fight. Id.
Daley left Florida for Washington on November 13 and did not return to Florida during the postelection battle. Id.
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nor the presence of Jim Baker, nor the election recount experience of
Ben Ginsberg.
On November 13, David Boies 9 1 was asked to join the Gore legal
team. Initially, Boies was seen as a high profile attorney who could be
Gore's appellate lawyer in Florida as Harvard Professor Laurence Tribe
was doing in Washington. Boies eventually became the team's public
face and even assumed the role originally occupied by Tribe as Gore's
advocate before the United States Supreme Court. Whatever his
considerable talents may be as an advocate, Boies too lacked experience
in election recounts or contests.
Therefore, although there were
members of the Gore team with recount experience equivalent to or
greater than anyone on the Bush legal team, 92 this Gore team advantage
was largely nullified by the lack of such experience at the highest
command levels.
Moreover, this lack of recount experience at the highest levels of the
Gore command structure left individual Gore attorneys in the recount
counties largely free to follow their own tactics for achieving a
satisfactory recount. This freedom led to a variation in tactics and
a difference in results among the four counties. 9 3 This lack of
experienced direction from above also left Gore attorneys on occasion

91. TAPPER, supra note 13, at 168-69. David Boies is generally regarded as one of the
foremost trial lawyers in the United States. Id. He started his own law firm, Boies, Schiller &
Flexner in 1997. Id. His major cases have included the federal government's antitrust suit
against Microsoft and the litigation between Texas and Pennzoil in which he faced the Bush team
lawyer Irv Terrell. Id. at 168, 293.
92. The attorneys on the Gore legal team with election recount experience included Jack
Young, see supra note 64 (explaining his expertise in election recounts), Chris Sautter, see supra
note 65 (explaining his background and his role on the Gore team), Jack Carrigan, and Dennis

Newman. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 104. All were dispatched to the four counties where
ballots were being recounted. Id.
93. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 66, 161-62, 165-66. Attorneys Jack Young and Chris

Sautter urged that the Gore team persuade canvassing boards to adopt an inclusive standard for
determining voter intent and to apply it uniformly in the manual recount. Id. The tactic was
anticipated by those attorneys to increase the total number of votes for both candidates while
maximizing Gore's net gain of votes from the four majority Democratic counties that were being
recounted. Id. This tactic was followed in Volusia, Broward, and Miami-Dade Counties. Id.
This contrasted with the tactic of the Gore attorneys in Palm Beach County trying to maximize
the number of votes counted for Gore while objecting to similarly marked ballots for Bush. Id.
Ultimately, the canvassing boards in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties found that
approximately 25% of the undervote ballots contained a valid vote. Id. The canvassing board of
Palm Beach County found a legal vote on only 5% of the county's undervote ballots (for a net
gain of 176-215 for Gore) while leaving an additional 3300 ballots uncounted (a net gain of an
additional 800 votes for Gore) that would likely have been considered valid votes under the
standard being applied by the other counties. Id.
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to quarrel among themselves about how to proceed statewide or in a
94
particular county.
Possibly the most important difference in the leadership of the two
opposing legal armies was their respective views on how the battle in
Florida would proceed or end. The Gore legal team tended to focus
on the immediate horizon, apparently expecting the post-election
maneuvering to last only a few days after November 7. Even as the
county recounts became protracted and the prospect of an election
contest became a reality, the team's overall decision-making remained
short-term. 9 5 On the other hand, Republican Jim Baker is credited with
having a longer-term view of how the battle would end. He reportedly
predicted as he flew to Tallahassee on November 8 that the United
96
States Supreme Court ultimately would decide the outcome in Florida.
He organized the Bush legal team accordingly. Events proved Jim
Baker correct.
C. RequiringA New Vote
During the days following the 2000 election, Democrats nationwide
watched anxiously as George W. Bush continued to win the tally of
legal votes in Florida even though there was a general sense that
significantly more voters in Florida had actually cast their ballots with
an intention to vote for Al Gore.
Voters in Palm Beach County claimed that the confusing format of
the presidential ballot used in that county had caused them, and
thousands of other voters in that Democratic stronghold, to mistakenly
mark their punch cards for other candidates 97 or to cast invalid

94. See, e.g., TAPPER, supra note 13, at 208 (describing conflict between two sets of Gore
attorneys in Broward County). Attorneys for Gore sometimes found themselves offering
conflicting guidance to the same canvassing boards. Id.
95. For example, David Boies had returned home after the November 21 decision of the
Florida Supreme Court, only to be recalled to Florida to prepare for an election contest.
96. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 42.
97. See NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 85-86., Approximately 25% of the residents of Palm
Beach County are Jewish and the county historically has voted heavily Democratic in statewide
and national elections. Id. Therefore, it is considered surprising that Reform Party presidential
candidate Pat Buchanan received over three times as many votes (3411) in the county as in any
other Florida county on November 7 despite being widely criticized as an anti-Semite. Id.
Similarly, Socialist Party candidate David McReynolds received 302 of his Florida statewide total
of 621 votes on November 7 from Palm Beach County. Id. at 93; see also Official Results, supra
note 3 (providing detailed election results for each county). These apparently anomalous vote
totals for Buchanan and McReynolds in Palm Beach County remain explainable to some
observers only as the product of voter confusion caused by the "butterfly ballot" where the names
of these two candidates appeared on the page opposite to the name of Al Gore. See NICHOLS,
supra note 15, at 94.
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overvotes because they marked their punch cards for multiple
presidential candidates instead of Gore. 98 This ballot became the focus
of national media attention and was designated the "butterfly ballot"
because of its appearance with presidential candidates aligned on
opposing pages and the punch holes arranged
vertically in the middle of
99
names.
candidate
the
between
ballot
the
Receiving less national attention during this initial period was the
ballot problem in Duval County. A combination of a multi-page
presidential ballot l °° and inaccurate voter instructions had caused as
many as 25% of the ballots in the heavily African-American precincts to
be disqualified as illegal overvotes because they contained a vote for
Gore and at least one other presidential candidate. 10 1 Altogether, there
were approximately 16,000 votes in Duval and Palm Beach Counties
that arguably had been intended for Gore but that had been miscast due
to a combination
of confusing ballots, misdirected voting instructions,
10 2
error.
voter
and
The "butterfly ballot" in Palm Beach County was the first potential
election irregularity to attract the attention of the Gore legal team.
Now, at the beginning of the legal battle in Florida, the Gore team was
confronted with its first major strategy choice. Several members of the
team urged that Gore's best legal strategy was to sue in Florida state
court to correct the effects of the "butterfly ballot."10 3 Several possible
options for remedy were suggested, including: (1) apportioning the
miscast votes by using some formula to parcel out some portion of the
Buchanan votes to Gore and Bush; (2) obtaining testimony from voters
98. Kane, supra note 9. Voters cast approximately 19,000 overvotes in the presidential race in
Palm Beach County. Id. Over 15,000 of these overvote ballots included a vote for Gore and a
vote for one or more other candidates. NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 91. Approximately 3750
ballots included a vote for Bush and a vote for one or more other candidates. Id.
99. The relevant portions of the ballot are depicted in NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 83, and
online at the NORC Website, supra note 2.
100. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 173. This ballot became known as the "caterpillar ballot."
Id.
101. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, ch. I, at 20-32, app. VII, at 10 (2001).
102. See METZER, supra note 15, at 179. There were over 9000 overvote ballots disqualified
in Palm Beach County because the voter had punched the card for Gore and for at least one other
presidential candidate, such as Buchanan (5264), McReynolds (2862), or Browne (1319). Id. In
Duval County, over 9000 of the county's disqualified overvote ballots came from predominately
African-American precincts where Gore had received 90% of the counted votes. See TOOBIN,
supra note 15, at 173.
103. Foremost among the attorneys who urged this position was Fort Lauderdale attorney,
Mitchell Berger. He remains of the opinion today that such litigation by Gore could have resulted
in a new election or an allocation of miscast ballots. Interview with Mitchell Berger, Al Gore
attorney, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (May 24, 2002.)
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who claim to have miscast their votes and reapportioning their votes
according to their stated intention; or (3) ordering a new presidential
election in Palm Beach County or Florida.
There is some precedent from Florida and other states in local
elections for such extraordinary remedies. 10 4 Nevertheless, the legal
obstacles to a challenge to the "butterfly ballot" were considered great,
particularly when ultimately a judge's decision could determine the
Presidency of the United States. For example, although some state
courts outside of Florida have been willing in a few rare circumstances
to statistically apportion or reallocate illegal or miscast votes in local
elections, 10 5 members of the Gore team were dubious as to whether any
state judge in Florida would be willing to decide the Presidency of the
United States on the basis of an expert witness's reallocation formula.
Similarly, although some state courts outside of Florida have allowed
and even required voters to testify about how they had voted in an
election and have determined the outcome of the election by adding or
deducting votes according to that testimony, 10 6 there were no means
apparent to the Gore legal team for proving which Florida voters had
actually miscast their ballots. Therefore, it was easy to imagine that any
evidentiary proceeding based on this remedy was likely to digress into a
seemingly endless number of Palm Beach County voters being
presented as witnesses by each candidate, with each voter swearing that
she had miscast her vote while intending to vote for Bush or for Gore;
not an attractive sight for determining who will be President of the
United States.
The remedy that seemed to hold the most hope was for a court to void
the November 7 election and to call a new election. While not a
preferred remedy, courts in Florida and elsewhere have on occasion
mandated new elections. 10 7 But this 2000 election was not a usual one;
104. See, e.g., infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Canales v. City of Alviso, 474 P.2d 417, 422 (Cal. 1970) (explaining how the
court subtracted illegal votes from the vote totals in a municipal consolidation election based on
circumstantial evidence that illegal voters most likely voted for the proposition); In re Purported
Election of Bill Durkin, 700 N.E.2d 1089, 1095 (I11.App. Ct. 1998) (explaining how the court
subtracted illegal votes from candidates by precinct according to the proportion of votes received
by the candidate in the precinct).
106. See, e.g., Green v. Reyes, 836 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. App. 1992).
107. See, e.g., Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 887 (3d Cir. 1994) (arguing that if the alleged
irregularity makes it impossible to determine the will of the voters, a court may call a new
election); In re Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots in the Nov. 4, 1997, Election,
707 So. 2d 1170, 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to approve a new election for
extensive absentee voting fraud in the Miami mayoral election because such a ruling "would be
sending out the message that the worst that would happen in the face of voter fraud would be
another election"); Becker v. Pfeifer, 588 N.W.2d 913, 918 (S.D. 1999) (explaining that under
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it was a nationwide vote for the Presidency of the United States.
Essentially, every voter in every state would have an interest in the
outcome and an argument for being allowed to participate in any new
election. Therefore, if a new election were an appropriate remedy,
would the election occur only in Palm Beach County, or in all of
Florida, or in all of the United States? Moreover, would a Florida court
have authority to require a new election in the face of the requirements
of the United States Constitution and federal law regarding the date for
the election of the President? Perhaps most importantly, however, the
possible remedy of a new election appeared almost inevitably to raise
questions of federal law that would allow the federal courts a basis for
intervening in the Florida election.
Significant problems also could be foreseen for overcoming the
threshold requirements of an election contest. Some of these problems
were similar to those that affected the availability of a remedy (e.g.,
how to actually prove that the "butterfly ballot" changed the outcome of
the election). Another problem existed in the apparently benign reasons
for the use of the "butterfly ballot." The miscast votes in Palm Beach
County might well have cost Gore the election, but no one was asserting
fraud as a cause. Therefore, even if the "butterfly ballot" could be
shown to be violative of state law, contestants would be forced to
concede that the violation apparently occurred as a result of official
misjudgment or mistake, not purposeful misconduct. Courts have been
10 8
reluctant to overturn elections because of unintentional errors.
Meeting the threshold requirement for an election contest, ultimately,
would prove even more difficult than expected.
The Gore legal team met on November 8 and 9 in Tallahassee to
consider its options. 1°9 The team's recommendations were then

South Dakota law, the court can only uphold the election as the free and fair expression of the
will of the voters or declare the election void); Green, 836 S.W.2d at 207 (indicating that in Texas
"[w]hen the court, with some degree of certainty, can determine the outcome of the election based
upon the evidence presented by the parties, [state law] requires it do so"). At least one state has
allowed a new election applicable only to one precinct or to certain specific voters previously
denied the opportunity to cast a qualified ballot. See State ex rel. Olson v. Bakken, 329 N.W.2d
575, 579-82 (N.D. 1983).
108. See, e.g., Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 269 (Fla. 1975) (listing the factors that
would justify voiding votes); Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., No. CV-00-2816, 2000
WL 1793429 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (rejecting a challenge to the misconduct of election officials when the
plaintiffs' evidence failed to support a finding of fraud, gross negligence, or intentional
wrongdoing by election officials), affd, 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000).
109. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 34-36 (describing the Gore legal team's consideration of
a possible challenge to the election result based on the use of a "butterfly ballot").
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presented on November 11 to Gore.1 10 The team decided against
directly pursuing litigation challenging the "butterfly ballot" on the
basis that such litigation Iwould
be virtually impossible (10% to 20%
ll
chance of success) to win.
A legal challenge to the "butterfly ballot" was pursued without
Gore's direct participation, however. 112 Circuit Court Judge Jorge
LaBarga rejected this challenge on the basis that, under Article II,
Section I, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution, he lacked
authority to call for a new vote in one county in the nation to decide the
Presidency of the United States. 1 13 This ruling was appealed. In
Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,114 the Florida
Supreme Court avoided the federal law basis for the circuit court's
decision and instead rejected the challenge on the basis that, as a matter
of law, the "butterfly ballot" did not constitute substantial
noncompliance with Florida law. 115 Therefore, the election contest
threshold had not been met.
An election contest challenging the "butterfly ballot" stood very little
chance of success. Gore's direct participation in such a challenge might
have given any such litigation greater validity in the eyes of a majority
of the Florida Supreme Court and possibly could have avoided a
dismissal such as occurred in Fladell. Any subsequent evidentiary
hearing, however, was likely to have consisted primarily of dubious,
self-serving testimony from expert and lay witnesses who clearly
favored one candidate or the other. The spectacle of the Presidency of
the United States being decided in such a proceeding is mind-boggling.

110. Id. at 52, 57. The Florida Supreme Court treated this case akin to an election contest
despite the fact that the case was timely filed before certification of the election results, when an
election contest would have been barred by state law as premature. Id. The court presumably
could have dismissed the suit as untimely, but instead ruled on the state law merits of the
challenge to the "butterfly ballot," thereby effectively preventing any subsequent timely election
contest. Id.
111. Id. at 55; see TAPPER, supra note 13, at 106 (indicating that Washington election law
attorney Bob Bauer quickly came "to the conclusion that the butterfly ballot lacks legal merit"
and that by November 15, Klain had discarded the "butterfly ballot" as a basis for a possible legal
challenge).
112. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 86; TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 80-82.
113. Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-10965AB, at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct.),
http://www.pbcountyclerk.com/courtdocuments/revote.pdf, affid per curiam, 772 So. 2d 1240

(Fla. 2000).
114. Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
115. Id. at 1242 (per curiam). Although generally treated as an election contest, this litigation
was filed too early (i.e., prior to the certification of the election) to meet statutory requirements
for an election contest.
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The legal obstacles identified by the Gore legal team for any
challenge to the "butterfly ballot" were legitimate and made success
unlikely even within a favorable Florida court system. Although the
"butterfly ballot" and related irregularities ostensibly were put aside by
the Gore team leadership as a basis for challenging the election, the
Gore legal team continued to use valuable time and resources
considering and documenting 116 the circumstances of the "butterfly
ballot" and other alleged election irregularities, such as possible Voting
Rights Act violations. None of these alleged irregularities was ever a
1 17
realistic basis on which Gore could obtain post-election relief.
D. Statewide Manual Recount
In its meeting on November 9, the Gore legal team not only decided
against filing litigation challenging the "butterfly ballot" but also
against seeking a recount of ballots statewide. The Gore legal team
agreed on a strategy of filing protests 118 only in Broward, Volusia, Palm
Beach and Miami-Dade Counties asking the canvassing boards in those
counties to manually review and hand-count the ballots in their
respective counties.
This ultimate strategy of seeking a manual recount in only four of
Florida's sixty-seven counties proved to be a crucial mistake. First, the
strategy was a legal mistake because it needlessly gave the Republicans
a basis for a federal court challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Gore legal team apparently overlooked the possibility of such a
challenge when initially deciding on its strategy. Some Gore election
lawyers apparently expected Bush to counter Gore's recount requests
with ones of his own or to agree with Gore to a statewide recount.1 19 If
116. See METZER, supra note 15, at 147. Affidavits were prepared without sufficient attention
to what they must contain in order to be of value in an election contest (e.g., the affidavits
indicated that the voters had "miscast" their vote). Id. Democratic officials explained that they
did not know that the affidavits needed to be worded to meet any particular legal test. Id. The
Gore legal team also considered possible action under the Voting Rights Act. See TAPPER, supra
note 13, at 59-60 (describing a Gore team memo suggesting the possibility of challenging alleged
Palm Beach County irregularities under the Voting Rights Act).
117. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 85. The Republican legal team apparently concluded very
early in the post-election battle that the "butterfly ballot" did not provide Gore with a sufficient
legal basis for challenging the election. Id. Bush attorney Barry Richard observed that the
"butterfly ballot" was a shame, but it wasn't much more than that: a shame. Id.
118. In Florida, a request for a manual recount of ballots comes in the form of a written
"protest" filed with the county canvassing board. FLA. STAT. ch. 102.166 (2000) (amended
2001).
119. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 48 (indicating that for Bush to have requested a recount in
his stronghold counties would have been the classic recount strategy). Gore attorney Mitchell
Berger indicates now that the Gore strategy was always to pursue a statewide recount but that the
Gore legal team expected to achieve this goal by seizing a lead in the vote totals through the

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

this had happened, the issues of fundamental fairness, equal protection,
and due process would have largely disappeared. It is questionable
whether the outcome of the election was ever going to be determined by
additional net votes gained by Gore through the counting of a statewide
category of ballots, such as undervote ballots, in only a few selected
counties favorable to the candidate. Fundamental fairness and common
sense suggest otherwise. 12 Even if the selective county strategy had
netted Gore sufficient votes to have pulled ahead of Bush by the time of
certification, Bush would have had bona fide grounds for an election
contest and, possibly, for a challenge in federal court.
Second, the strategy was a mistake as a practical matter because the
limited recount never generated sufficient net Gore votes to allow Gore
to overtake Bush's narrow lead. The ostensibly friendly canvassing
boards in Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties balked at giving Gore
the relief he sought. Moreover, it was foreseeable on November 9 that
Bush would gain additional net votes from late-filed absentee ballots.
Therefore, recounting undervote ballots in only these four counties
provided Gore with too slim of a margin of possible net votes.
Third, the strategy was a public relations nightmare because it made
Gore's post-election effort vulnerable to charges of cherry picking votes
from Democratic counties and canvassing boards instead of legitimately
attempting to "count all votes."
Finally, the strategy was a mistake because it flew directly in the face
of the strategy recommended by recount specialists, including those
advising Gore. The Recount Primer, written by Gore legal team
members Jack Young and Chris Sautter, explained that if a candidate is
behind, the scope of the recount should be as broad as possible and the
rules for the recount should be different from those used election night.
A recount should be an audit of the election to insure the accuracy and

recounts in the four counties and forcing Bush (Jeb or George W.) to agree to a recount
elsewhere. Interview with Mitchell Berger, Al Gore attorney, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (May 24,
2002).
120. See, e.g., In re Issue 27 Election of Nov. 4, 1997, 693 N.E.2d 1190 (Ohio Ct. Common
Pleas, Licking County 1998) (disallowing recount where manual counts by board of only the
votes "for" a municipal proposition produced an increase in votes sufficient to change the
outcome. The court reasoned that if irregularities (i.e., loosened chads) affected votes "for" the
proposition, it was incumbent on the canvassing board to inspect the ballots for "no" votes as
well). The canvassing authority has the duty to ensure a fair and accurate recount. Id. at 1192; In
re Opening of Ballot Box, 25 A.2d 330 (Pa. 1942) (revoking certification of the recount on
finding that erasures had caused invalidation of ballots in one precinct and ordering checks for
similar tampering in another fifteen precincts); McIntyre v. Wick, 558 N.W.2d 347 (S.D. 1996)
(challenging the inconsistent methods by which certain types of ballots (straight party) were
counted in different counties within a state legislative district).
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honesty of the results. 12 1 As it turned out, the Gore legal team simply
did not know enough on November 9 about what uncounted votes
existed in Florida to limit itself to just the four counties.
The greatest objection in my view to a strategy of seeking recounts
selectively among supposedly friendly partisans is that the strategy
reflects a cynical view of the government institutions responsible for
assuring the integrity of state and federal elections. As it turned out, the
success of the Gore team in obtaining manual recounts in these four
counties was not determined by the partisan make-up of the canvassing
boards. For example, the recount effort in Volusia County was
relatively smooth and successful for the Gore team even though the
chairman of the canvassing board was Republican. 122 The success of
the manual recount in Broward County was in large part due to the
willingness of the chief lawyer for the county (a Republican) to approve
a more inclusive standard for determining voter intent. 12 3 Indeed, the
recount efforts in Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties were less
successful even though a majority of the canvassing board in each
county was Democratic. Nevertheless, despite Gore's relative lack of
success based on the partisanship of the board, the choice of those four
counties because they were expected to be politically friendly helped
initiate a cycle in which all of Florida's institutions, including its courts,
ultimately were perceived as acting for partisan reasons.
To the surprise of some of the Gore legal team, Bush did not petition
124
for a manual recount in any of the remaining sixty-three counties.
Initially, this Republican strategy was criticized by some observers as a
serious mistake 125 that could have cost Bush the election if Gore's

121. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 28; see TIMOTHY DOWNS ET AL., THE RECOUNT PRIMER 5
(1993).
122. Judge Michael McDermott resisted pressure from Democratic Attorney General
Butterworth in regard to the recount only to then support a full recount of Volusia County's
ballots on the basis that "[t]oo much is at stake not to do a full recount." See TAPPER, supra note
13, at 133.
123. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 162 (indicating that county lawyer Ed Dion "thought the
only fair thing to do was loosen the standard and recognize more votes").
124. Baker would have no part of such a defensive response. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at
86 (indicating that Baker's instruction was for the legal team to discredit anything that happens
from now on).
125. Some Democrats feel that the Republicans failed to timely file recount protests because
they were unprepared for Gore's recount initiative. Interview with Jack Young, Al Gore attorney,
in Washington, D.C. (May 27, 2002). Republican attorneys respond that the Bush strategy from
the beginning was to fight all recount efforts because the Bush legal and public relations stance
was that the election was over and that the manual counting of ballots was a subjective, partisan
means of stealing the election. When Gore later offered to join with Bush in asking for a
statewide recount, Bush did not accept. By this point, however, the selective nature of the Gore
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strategy of manually recounting ballots in only four heavily Democratic
counties resulted in enough net votes to put Gore ahead statewide and if
Gore's strategy withstood challenge in federal court.
The Republican position publicly was that the election was already
over. Some Republican attorneys acknowledge, however, that some
members of the Bush legal team believed that Democratic voters, being
"generally poorer and less well educated," were more likely to have
committed a "voter error" that resulted in their votes going uncounted
statewide. 126 Therefore, some members of the Bush legal team opposed
a manual counting of ballots statewide because of the possibility that a
net gain in votes might be realized by Gore even in counties in which a
majority of the already counted votes had gone for Bush. 127 The recent
reviews of uncounted ballots
statewide suggest that these attorneys may
have been partly correct. 128
E. Influencing Government Officials
Both candidates and their respective legal teams tried privately
throughout the post-election process to influence how Florida
government officials carried out their statutory duties.
Katherine Harris, in particular, has been seen as using her office as
Florida Secretary of State to help elect candidate Bush. Several writers
129
have reported how Republican attorney J.M. "Mac" Stipanovich
assisted Secretary Harris throughout the post-election process in the
development and adoption of official positions that would aid Bush.130
Mr. Stipanovich freely acknowledges his role and is unapologetic for
doing what he sees both as legal and necessary to the victory of the
candidate he supported. 131
132
All of the official positions and actions taken by Secretary Harris
as Florida's chief elections officer during the post-election process were

recount had been recognized by the Bush legal team as giving them the issue needed for possibly
stating a federal question before the United States Supreme Court.
126. Interview with Mac Stipanovich, attorney, in Tallahasse, Fla. (Feb. 1, 2002).
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (indicating that Gore could have prevailed
with a recount statewide of both undervotes and overvotes).
129. Mr. Stipanovich has been called "the state's premier Republican power broker." See
TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 68-70.
130. See generally id. at 69-76, 185-88.
131. Interview with Mac Stipanovich, attorney, in Tallahasse, Fla. (Feb. 1, 2002).
132. Secretary of State Harris was co-chairperson of the Bush election campaign in Florida.
She maintained during the post-election process that she was exercising her official duties as
Secretary of State without partisan favoritism. She has continued to take this stance since 2000
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potentially advantageous for Bush and disadvantageous for Gore. First,
on November 13, the Elections Division of the Department of State
issued Letter Advisory Opinion DE 00-11 to the chairman of the
Republican Party in Florida indicating that a county canvassing board
could not conduct a manual recount in the absence of a voting machine
malfunction, not for mere voter error. 133 Even though wrong, 134 the
Election Division's advisory opinion had the effect of temporarily
stopping the manual recounts in Palm Beach and Broward Counties.
Second, when asked by Volusia County to extend the November 14
deadline for accepting county returns, Secretary of State Harris refused
on the basis that she had no discretion to accept county returns after
November 14 except in the event of natural disaster. Her position, if
correct, meant that the results of the recounts in at least three of the four
counties could never be accepted.
Third, when told by Circuit Judge Terry Lewis 135 that she did have
discretion to consider county returns filed after November 14, Secretary
of State Harris asked the counties to explain why they were conducting
the manual recounts and then, upon receiving those reasons, rejected
them. Attorneys representing Harris tried but failed to defend her
decision before the Florida Supreme Court. 1 3 6 As a result, the Court
extended the deadline for the filing of county returns to 5:00 p.m. on
November 26.137
Fourth, when November 26 arrived, Secretary of State Harris refused
to accept the partial recount returns sent by Palm Beach County before
5:00 p.m., or the final returns sent by the County two hours later. The
effect was to deny Gore a net gain of 215 votes. Finally, as the Bush
effort to garner additional absentee votes from ballots cast by overseas
military personnel gained momentum statewide, Secretary of State

while also appearing to revel in her fame within the Republican Party as "the darling of
Republicans." See NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 110.
133. Definitions of Errors in Vote Tabulation, Op. Dir. Div. of Elections DE 00-11 (Nov. 13,
2000), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/de2000/de00_ 11.html (last visited Nov.
23, 2002) [hereinafter Definitions of Errors in Vote Tabulation].
134. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1226-27 (Fla.) (per curiam),
vacatedper curiam sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
135. McDermott v. Harris, No. CV-00-2700, 2000 WL 1693713, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 14,
2000). Judge Lewis concluded that determining ahead of time that returns will be ignored unless
excused by some Act of God is not an exercise of discretion, but an abdication of that discretion.
Id. He reasoned that the exercise of discretion contemplates a decision based upon a weighing
and consideration of all attendant facts and circumstances. Id.
136. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1289-92 (Fla. 2000)
(per curiam) [hereinafter Palm Beach County CanvassingBd. I1].
137. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1240 (per curiam).
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Harris refrained from explaining or enforcing Florida requirements for
such ballots in a way that would interfere with the Bush effort.
If the allegations are true, possibly the most significant assistance
provided to Bush by Secretary of State Harris came indirectly through
one of her assistants, Ms. Kerey Carpenter. Ms. Carpenter is alleged to
have convinced the chairman of the canvassing board in Palm Beach
County that the board should use a narrow standard of counting only
ballots with a "hanging chad" in its manual review of ballots. 138 One
writer has claimed "it is no exaggeration to say that Kerey Carpenter
and Charles Burton [the chairman of the Palm Beach County canvassing
board] won the presidency for George W. Bush." 139 Gore in his
standard used
election contest petition claimed that the more restrictive
140
in Palm Beach County cost him a net of 800 votes.
The Gore legal team also sought the help of its allies in the Florida
government. Florida Attorney General Bob Butterworth responded to
the Elections Division's November 13 advisory opinion with an official

opinion of his own. Attorney General Advisory Legal Opinion 2000-65
was issued on November 14 and expressly concluded that the Elections
Division advisory opinion was wrong. 14 1 The Attorney General's

opinion had the merit of being legally correct. Nevertheless, there can
be little doubt that the rush to draft and to issue the opinion within
twenty-four hours of the release of the Secretary of State's opinion was
intended to prevent the manual recounts from being halted. Moreover,
the Attorney General's Office continued to be aligned with Gore's legal
team during appeals to the Florida Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court.

138. County Judge Burton denies this view of events. Interview with the Honorable Charles
Burton, Palm Beach County Judge, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (May 24, 2002). Judge Burton
indicates that the canvassing board's unanimous (3-0) decision to apply the more stringent
standard had its origin in a policy adopted by the canvassing board in 1990 and a mistaken belief
that Broward County was continuing to apply the more stringent standard. Id. Judge Burton
insists that Ms. Carpenter never advocated using one standard or another; but instead insisted that
the county had no right under Florida law to conduct a recount at all. Id. Subsequent Democratic
efforts to convince the canvassing board to change back to a more inclusive standard were
rejected unanimously by the members of the board. Id.
139. TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 86.
140. A later review by the Palm Beach Post found that, if the more inclusive (dimpled ballot)
standard, as applied in Broward County, had been applied to all of the .undervote ballots in Palm
Beach County, Gore would have had a net gain of 784 votes. See Engelhardt & Jaspin, supra
note 9. With these votes, Gore's total net gain from the recount in Palm Beach County would
have been at least 950 votes; more than sufficient to have overcome Bush's lead.
141. See Advisory Op. Att'y Gen. of Fla., No. 2000-65 (Nov. 14, 2000) (indicating that "error
in voter tabulation.., encompasses a discrepancy between the number of votes determined by a
voter tabulation system and the number of votes determined by a manual count").
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Other examples exist of attempts by one or the other candidate or his
representative to privately influence other Florida officials, including
the members of county canvassing boards and Alex Penelas, then the
142
mayor of Miami.
F. Administrative Recount Versus Election Contest
By November 13, it was apparent to the Gore legal team that at least
three of the manual recounts would not be finished in time to be filed
with the Secretary of State on November 14. Secretary of State Harris
refused to extend the deadline. Therefore, the Gore legal team
now faced another major strategic decision.
The team had two
alternatives. 143 First, Gore could try to extend the time available for
completing the recounts by asking the Florida courts to overturn
Secretary Harris's decision and to compel her to accept recount results
after November 14. The second alternative was to allow Secretary
Harris to certify Bush as the winner based on the county returns filed on
November 14 and then to proceed immediately to state circuit court to
144
contest the election outcome.
A strong case can be made for why Gore should have foregone any
effort to continue the attempted recounts and should have proceeded on
November 16 to challenge the election outcome in an election contest.
The election contest would have been a de novo proceeding unaffected
by the partisan maneuvering and chaotic action that marked the
continuation of the administrative recount process in Palm Beach and
Miami-Dade Counties. More importantly, a timely filed election
contest would have allowed Florida courts an opportunity to arrive at a
standard for manually counting undervote and overvote ballots
statewide in a fundamentally fair and constitutionally uniform manner.
Some of Gore's Florida lawyers continue to believe that the failure to

142. See, e.g., TAPPER, supra note 13, at 274-77; id. at 79 (describing Attorney General
Butterworth's call to the chairman of the Volusia County Canvassing Board); TOOBIN, supra note
15, at 148-51 (describing attempts by Gore and his supporters to obtain the assistance of Miami
Mayor Alex Penelas in convincing the Miami-Dade canvassing board to complete a recount).
143. One writer has suggested that the Gore legal team never timely realized the option of
immediately pursuing an election contest. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 196-97. This
suggestion is strongly disputed by several of the Gore attorneys who indicate that early in the
post-election process they advised the legal team's leadership that an election contest was
available in state court after certification of the election. Telephone Interview with Dexter
Douglass, Al Gore attorney (May 2002).
144. Under Florida law an election contest can be filed only following certification of an
election result. FLA. STAT. ch. 102.168 (2000); see also TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 196-97
(discussing the timeline for contesting election results).
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immediately file an election contest after the circuit 1court's
refusal to
45
extend the time for protests was a crucial misjudgment.
Extending the certification deadline to allow time for Gore to move
ahead of Bush during the administrative recount also was a possibly
winning strategy. The argument was that neither Gore nor Bush was
likely to prevail in an election contest, given the time constraints and the
myriad of legal issues, parties, and attorneys likely to be part of any
such proceeding. Therefore, the winner of the certification could very
likely remain the winner of the election. Extending the certification
deadline to allow Gore to move ahead of Bush in the vote tally prior to
certification was a potentially winning strategy, however, only if Gore's
legal team used the extra days to gather the votes necessary to be ahead
at certification.
Gore's team successfully prevented the State Election Board and
Katherine Harris from certifying the election results prior to November
26, 2000. Amended returns submitted by 5:00 p.m. on November
26
146
were to be accepted and included in the final certification. 1
Gore s
strategy might have worked if the intervening period from November
14-26 had been more productive. By the time of certification on
November 26, however, Gore faced the worst possible situation. Of the
three counties, only Broward County had finished its recount in time to
have its amended returns included in the certified returns. Bush was the
certified winner with an increased margin of 537 votes, and Gore had
ten fewer days in which to successfully prosecute an election contest.
G. Manual Recount Fights in Specific Counties
The manual review and hand-counting of ballots proceeded
differently in each of the four counties targeted by the Gore legal team
strategy. One county, Volusia, used optical scan counting equipment.
The other three counties used punch-card ballots.
Volusia County. The manual review and hand-counting of ballots in
Volusia County was successfully achieved in a relatively orderly
manner in the time available after November 7. The Republican
Chairman of the canvassing board, Judge Michael McDermott, and
Gore legal team member Jack Young, generally have been credited with
responsibility for the relative ease and business-like manner in which
the manual recount was achieved. This process was made substantially
easier, however, because the county utilized an optical scan voting
145. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Dexter Douglass, Al Gore attorney (May 2002).
146. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. H1,772 So. 2d 1273, 1289-90 (Fla. 2000) (per

curiam).
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system. Volusia County thereby avoided the most difficult issues of
voter intent that dominated the manual review and counting of punch
card ballots in the other three counties. 147 Volusia County completed
its manual recount on November 14, with a net gain by Gore of ninetyeight votes.
Broward County. The manual review and hand-counting of punch
card ballots also was successfully completed in Broward County before
the court-ordered November 26 date for certification of final statewide
results. On November 13, the canvassing board voted not to conduct a
full manual recount. This decision came largely in response to the
issuance that day of Elections Division Advisory Opinion DE 00-11.148
The canvassing board subsequently voted to reconsider its decision and
on November 15 voted to manually review and hand-count all ballots in
the county. The canvassing board initially applied a very narrow
standard for determining when a voter's intent could be ascertained.
Many ballots were discarded as invalid undervotes. On November 19,
the board voted unanimously to change to a more inclusive standard for
ascertaining voter intent. The board subsequently reexamined the
ballots that had been reviewed and proceeded to finish its manual
review and hand-counting of ballots on November 25 within time to
meet the deadline for filing results with the Secretary of State. The
manual recount in Broward had been successful
for the Gore team,
14 9
giving Gore a total of 567 additional net votes.
Palm Beach County. The manual recount in Palm Beach County may
have been one of the Gore legal team's darkest moments and possibly
determinative of the outcome of the election. The canvassing board was
actually the first to vote in favor of conducting a manual recount, doing
so on November 12. On the following day, however, the board
147. Deciding whether a dimple, indentation, or puncture of a chad on a punch-card ballot
reflects an intent to cast a vote for a specific candidate proved controversial and contentious in the
recount counties using punch-card machines. For example, one participant observed that "[a]
dimple to one person can be a shadow to another." METZER, supra note 15, at 176. On the other
hand, observers readily reached agreement on uncounted optical scan ballots where a failure by a
voter to sufficiently darken the selected oval or to use the correct pen, or a decision by a voter to
both darken an oval and write-in the name of the same candidate left little doubt of a voter's
intent. For example, a manual review of uncounted optical scan ballots in Gadsden County
during the automatic recount on November 8 readily resulted in an agreement on the valid votes
included among the previously uncounted optical scan ballots. The result was an additional 187
votes, with a net gain for Gore of 170 votes. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 72.
148. Definitions of Errors in Vote Tabulation, supra note 133.
149. Despite the inclusive standard apparently adopted by Broward County, one report
indicates that "dimples" or "indentations" existed in enough additional ballots that Gore could
have netted as many as an additional 1000 votes from the county. See METZER, supra note 15, at
248.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

suspended its recount upon issuance of Division of Elections Letter
Advisory Opinion DE 00_11.15° The manual recount did not begin
again until November 16. The canvassing board then suspended
counting over the Thanksgiving holiday, resuming its recount on
November 24. The board failed to complete the recount by the deadline
of 5:00 p.m. on November 26. Secretary of State Harris refused to
accept the county's submission of a partial recount total, and then
refused to accept the completed results when they were submitted after
the 5:00 p.m. deadline. 15 1 As a result, the net gain by Gore of 215 (or
176)152 votes from the recount was not included in the state's certified
election returns.
The much more serious aspect of the outcome in Palm Beach County
is the effect of the County canvassing board's use of a very narrow
standard (i.e., "hanging chad") for ascertaining the intent of a voter to
cast a vote for a particular candidate. Using the narrower standard, the
canvassing board found that only approximately 5% of the undervote
ballots contained a valid vote. By comparison, the more inclusive
standard used for punch card ballots by the canvassing boards in
Broward and Miami-Dade Counties had shown an ascertainable intent
to vote for a specific candidate in approximately 25% of the undervote
ballots. 15 3 The effect of using the narrower standard in Palm Beach
County was to leave 3300 ballots uncounted, even though the
participating Gore or Bush representatives often thought that ballot
showed the requisite voter intent. Counting these ballots as votes would
have given Gore a net gain of approximately 800 additional votes, 15 4 for
a total net gain155of approximately 1000 votes from the recount in Palm
Beach County.

It has been suggested that the decision to use the narrower standard
was the result of behind the scenes maneuvering by Kerey Carpenter of
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (discussing the influence Kerey
Carpenter and Charles Burton had on the outcome of the election).
152. The Gore monitors insist the number is 215. The County canvassing board tally shows
only 176. The Republicans adopt the canvassing board total. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 188.
The Florida Supreme Court noted this disagreement and left it unresolved. See Gore v. Harris,
772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 n.6 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'dper curiam sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98 (2000).
153. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 165-66.
154. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 165; Engelhardt & Jaspin, supra note 9. Gore alleged in
his election contest petition that application of the appropriate (more inclusive) standard would
have resulted in a gain of 800 votes. The Palm Beach Post found Gore's net gain from these
additional ballots to be 784. See Engelhardt & Jaspin, supra note 9.
155. The addition of 744-800 net Gore votes to the 176-215 already counted under the more
stringent standard would have given Gore a net gain of approximately 1000 votes.
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the Department of State's Division of Elections. 156 Allegedly Ms.
Carpenter convinced Charles Burton, the chairman of the canvassing
board of Palm Beach County, that the narrower standard was more
appropriate. The outcome in Palm Beach County may have been at
least partly a result of the tactics followed by Gore legal team members
in the County, however.
Gore lawyers were divided about how to succeed in Palm Beach
County. Jack Young, in Volusia County, and Chris Sautter, in Broward
County, had approached the recount process by encouraging the
canvassing boards to uniformly apply an inclusive standard of review to
all ballots. The effect in these counties of increasing the total number of
valid votes for both candidates was to increase the net gain of votes for
Gore. Gore continued in each of these counties to receive a majority of
the newly found votes just as he had received a majority of votes in
these counties on November 7. A similar tactic might have worked in
Palm Beach County, in which Gore had received almost 63% of the
votes cast on November 7. Instead, Gore team lawyers in Palm Beach
County fought early and hard for every Gore vote by urging the
counting of each ballot potentially containing a vote for Gore, while not
urging the counting of similarly marked ballots for Bush. 157 This
tactic ultimately was counterproductive because it increased the
contentiousness within the recount process and slowed the process.
Ultimately, such partisan haggling from both sides made it easier for the
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board to count only clearly marked
ballots and to refuse Democratic entreaties by Dennis Newman and
David Boies after November 16 to change to a more inclusive

standard. 158
Miami-Dade County. The canvassing board of Miami-Dade County
did not decide to conduct a manual recount of ballots countywide
until November 17. The County never completed the process. The
canvassing board was utilizing an inclusive standard for reviewing and
counting ballots, but was only able to finish recounting 20% of the
county's precincts. These precincts were the most heavily Democratic
in the county and resulted in a net gain for Gore of 168 votes. 15 9 The
canvassing board's efforts to complete the manual recount came to an
abrupt end on November 22 when the board voted to cancel the recount.
156. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 85-86; see also supra notes 138-40 and accompanying
text (discussing Carpenter's role in choosing what standard to apply).
157. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 165-66.
158. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 306-08.
159. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'd per curiam sub nom.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 197.
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On November 22, Miami's Clark Center, where the canvassing board
was meeting, erupted with demonstrations against the Board and the
recount. Some writers claim that the demonstrators were largely
Republican congressional aides and that the demonstrations were part of
an organized Republican effort to stop the recount. 160 The county made
no effort to submit the results of its partial recount with its election
returns. Approximately 9000 undervote ballots were never manually
reviewed.
Statewide. The Gore legal team's victory in Palm Beach County v.
Harris,16 1 which extended the deadline for submitting county election
returns from November 14 to November 26, provided a significant
opportunity for success. Even with greater time to complete the
recounts, however, the Gore legal team was unable to secure the
necessary votes. The Gore strategy remained limited to completing the
three county recounts that had not yet been finished. Little if any
thought apparently was given at this stage as to how else Gore might
gain net votes. Meanwhile, although continuing to vigorously oppose
Gore's recount efforts, the Bush legal team also used the time of the
extension to persuade county canvassing boards to count a greater
number of late-received absentee ballots. 16 2 The Gore team's efforts
to timely complete the recounts in Palm Beach and Miami-Dade
Counties ultimately proved unsuccessful. Therefore, as the deadline
on November 26 passed, Bush remained ahead in the vote. He was
certified the winner. Gore's only remaining option for victory was to
successfully contest the outcome of the election.
H. Counting of Late-Received Absentee Ballots
Florida allows absentee ballots for federal offices to be received from
16 3
absent qualified electors overseas as late as ten days after an election.
Qualified absent overseas electors under Florida law include members
of the armed services and other permanent residents of the State of
Florida who are temporarily residing outside the United States. 164 The
allowance for these late-received absentee ballots to be received after
160. See NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 153 (showing a photograph of the "riot" with the
participants separately numbered and identified as current and former Republican congressional
aides).
161.

Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1239-40 (Fla.) (per curiam),

vacated per curiam sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000);
see also supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the breadth of the Secretary of State's
discretion to extend the deadline for submitting returns).
162. See Barstow & Van Natta, supra note 8.
163. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.013(7) (2000).
164. FLA. STAT. ch. 101.62 (2000).
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the date of the election is coupled with state and federal requirements
16 5
intended to prevent fraud and to maintain the integrity of the election.
The successful efforts of the Bush legal team to contest how some
county canvassing boards initially applied these requirements has been
scornfully called "unseemly trolling" 16 6 for votes or "Thanksgiving
Stuffing." 6 7 Ultimately, however, it was the Bush legal team that won
federal court sanction of most of its legal reasoning for counting
additional overseas ballots.
During the initial days after the election, neither side was sure
whether counting these late-received absentee ballots would help or hurt
their candidate. The Republicans feared that civilians 16 8 overseas might
be a source of votes for Gore. The Gore team feared that votes from
military personnel overseas might go heavily for Bush. Both sides
prepared for the possibility of challenging late-received absentee
ballots. Mark Herron of Tallahassee prepared and circulated a legal
memorandum for the Democrats indicating possible reasons for
16 9
invalidating late-received overseas ballots for violating Florida law.
David Aufhauser of the Washington firm of Williams & Connolly
oversaw the preparation of materials for the Republican effort.17 0
Eventually, the very different positions of the two legal teams
emerged. Democrats determined that their candidate was best served by
limiting the counting of all late-received absentee ballots. Republicans
concluded that overseas military personnel were more likely in 2000 to
vote for Bush than for Gore. Therefore, the Republicans adopted a
strategy designed to maximize the number of net votes for Bush. The
objective for the Bush legal team, through its statewide network of
attorneys, became to increase the acceptance and counting of latereceived ballots in counties that Bush had won on November 7
165.

See Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1315 (N.D. Fla.

2000).
166. See TAPPER, supra note 15, at 301.
167. See Barstow & Van Natta, supra note 8 (discussing the Republican public relations
campaign used to persuade "selected Bush counties" to reconsider rejected oversees military
ballots).
168. The primary Republican concern was about Jewish civilians temporarily residing in
Israel. Id.
169. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 96. Mark Herron is a Tallahassee attorney who prepared a
legal memorandum or "playbook" for use by the Gore legal team in opposing the counting of the
late-received absentee ballots that did not comply with Florida law. Id. at 131, 174. Herron is a
campaign law expert who worked previously for former Florida Governor Lawton Chiles.
TAPPER, supra note 13, at 58, 205-06.
170. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 96. David Aufhauser is a Washington attorney who has
represented clients as diverse as Oliver North and Bill Clinton. Id. He is credited with being the
architect of the Republicans' legal strategy in Florida on the overseas absentee ballots. Id. at 273.
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(especially those with a large military presence), while limiting the
acceptance and counting1 of such ballots in those counties that had voted
17
by majority for Gore.
When the position of the Gore legal team for disqualifying overseas
ballots became known publicly on or about November 18, it was
condemned by Republicans and others as an effort to invalidate military
ballots because of technicalities. Even the Democratic vice presidential
candidate Joe Lieberman agreed on national television that he would be
in favor of giving the benefit of the doubt to ballots coming from
72
military personnel. 1
The late-received absentee ballots were counted by November 18.
Bush had gained 1380 votes; Gore had gained 750 votes. 17 3 This result
showed that these overseas absentee ballots were a potentially important
source of net votes for Bush. The result also showed that county
canvassing boards had disallowed a significant number of the ballots for
failing to comply with the requirements of state or federal law.
Rather than being satisfied with the results on November 18, the
Bush legal team moved quickly to use the extension of the certification
deadline as an opportunity to persuade many of Florida's counties to
reconsider some of the ballots that had been disallowed. When some
counties balked, the Bush legal team filed suit in Leon County against
fourteen of them. 174 The legal issues raised by the Bush team were far
from spurious. Most arose from the potential for conflict between
Florida law and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting

Act. 175
The defendant counties had systematically rejected overseas military
ballots that lacked a proper 176 or readable postmark, had arrived in an
undated envelope, were undated, or were received from voters who
were not shown by county records to have requested an absentee ballot.
Bush argued that some of these rejections were clearly wrong under
171. Id. at 96.
172. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 131.
173. See CORRESPONDENTS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES, supra note 15, at 101.
174. Compl. for Declaratory & Inj. Relief at 3-4, Bush v. Bay County Canvassing Bd., No.
CV-00-2799 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 2000), available at http://199.44.225.4/courtDockets/pdf/
electioncases/CV-00-2799a.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2002).
175. See id. at 2-3; Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1315
(N.D. Fla. 2000).
176. For example, under Florida law a postmark is improper if it is domestic. See, e.g.,
Shailagh Marray et al., GOP Says Democrats Wrongly Discarded Hundreds of Overseas
Absentee Ballots, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2000, at A28, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26617399
(reporting that the Democrats argued to throw out overseas ballots that did not bear foreign or
military postmarks).
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federal law. Although section 101.62 of the Florida Statutes provided
that an overseas absentee ballot could be considered only if it bears "an
APO, FPO, or foreign postmark," this requirement had been relaxed
pursuant to an agreed federal judgment, and the operative state law was
embodied in Florida Administrative Code Section 1S-2.013(7). 17 7 That
provision requires only that an overseas ballot be "postmarked or signed
and dated no later than the date of the Federal election." 17 8 Moreover,
the Bush legal team argued that insofar as state law was interpreted by
the canvassing boards to require rejecting federal ballots with a
domestic postmark or for which no ballot application existed in the
county records, the state law conflicted with federal law.
After oral arguments on November 24 before Leon Circuit Judge
Ralph "Bubba" Smith, the Bush legal team filed a voluntary
dismissal 179 indicating that it appeared that many of the defendant
counties were now in substantial agreement with the plaintiffs. Some
county canvassing boards had met or had indicated an intention to
meet to reconsider rejected late-received absentee ballots.18 For those
counties who remained recalcitrant, the Bush legal team proposed
further litigation in a different forum.
The Bush legal team then pursued six of the same counties in federal
court. On November 26, a complaint for declaratory and injunctive
relief was filed before United States District Judge Lacey A. Collier in
the Northern District of Florida.181 The allegations were essentially the
same as in the earlier state suit (i.e., the conflict of state law with federal
law). Judge Collier noted that although initially there had been
inferences that the defendant canvassing boards had acted for political

177. FLA. STAT. ch. 101.62 (2000); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IS-2.013(7) (2000).
178. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.013(7) (2000) (emphasis added).
179. Various reasons have been given for why the Bush legal team moved immediately to
voluntarily dismiss its lawsuit. TOOBIN, Supra note 15, at 170-71. First, it is suggested that the
lawsuit was no longer needed because most of the counties had agreed to reconsider previously
rejected ballots. Id. Second, it is suggested that Judge Smith's concerns about proper venue
prompted the Bush legal team to move its litigation to the separate counties. Id. Finally, and by
far the most interesting theory, it is suggested that the team was concerned by Judge Smith's
questions regarding a consent decree and resulting administrative rule overriding the specific
provisions of Florida statutes. Id. According to this theory, the team was concerned that Smith
might actually declare that the ten-day extension (which also had its origin in the consent decree)
was invalid and, therefore, that none of the late-received ballots should be counted. Id.
180. For example, the canvassing board of Clay County was one of the fourteen counties sued
in state court. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 297. In return for dismissal from the lawsuit, Clay
County agreed to reconsider the seventeen late-received absentee ballots that it had rejected. Id.
It then accepted fourteen of the ballots, representing twelve votes for Bush. Id.
181. See Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (N.D. Fla.
2000).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

reasons, there was no evidence presented to the court to substantiate
such inferences and the canvassing boards apparently had acted with the
best of intentions. 182
Judge Collier upheld most of Bush's claims. He concluded that
Florida's law was that a ballot should be counted if postmarked
or signed and dated on or before the election. Therefore, county
canvassing boards could reject ballots without a postmark or the
required signature and date, but could not require that ballots have
both. 18 3 Insofar as ballots with domestic postmarks were concerned,
Judge Collier found that to cast a federal write-in ballot, the voter must
sign an oath that the ballot has been mailed from outside the United
States and that the oath is sufficient to allow the ballot to be counted,
even when the postmark is domestic. 184 Finally, Judge Collier found
that a canvassing board could not reject federal write-in ballots185
because
voter.
the
from
application
ballot
absentee
an
lacked
county
the
Several writers have criticized the Bush team's effort. 18 6 Some of
these criticisms apparently arise from a misunderstanding of the
applicable law. Judge Collier's opinion provides a clear guide to
applicable state and federal law, and nullifies some of the criticisms of
the Bush team's effort. Other criticisms, however, remain. These relate
to the Bush team's strategy of focusing on military ballots and on only
those counties in which Bush was likely to receive a majority of the
counted late-received absentee ballots.
There is little, however, to criticize in this legal strategy. The Bush
legal team was able to make a credible factual and legal argument that
the federal law was intended to facilitate voting by members of the
armed services and government service overseas and that a strict
interpretation of state law to reject the absentee ballots of these voters
conflicted with the purpose and provisions of that federal law. The
Bush strategy of making this argument only in those counties in which
the counting of additional votes was likely to add net votes to the Bush
total was certainly no more partisan than a Gore strategy of counting

182. Id. at 1307.
183. Id. at 1314-15.
184. Id. at 1316.
185. Id. at 1317.
186. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 299-301; TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 170-71; Barstow &
Van Natta, supra note 8. Interestingly, none of these sources mention the decision by Judge
Collier. Many of Judge Collier's determinations have since been codified as part of federal law.
See, e.g., Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, tit. VII, 116 Stat. 1666, 1722
(2002) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545) (delineating the voting rights of military
members and overseas citizens).
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undervote ballots in only heavily Democratic counties. The real reason
for Democrat complaints about the Bush strategy seems to be that the
Bush team's effort to increase the counting of overseas ballots
selectively by county escaped criticism at the same time that the Bush
team was publicly attacking Gore's recount efforts as partisan "cherrypicking."
The Republican strategy in heavily Democratic counties was to allow
the Democrats to inflict significant self-injury. The Gore legal team
was urging in these counties that late-received absentee ballots be
rejected if they appeared to violate state law. Bush's attorneys
acquiesced in this position. The result may have determined the
outcome of the election. Approximately 1.8 million votes had been
187
counted on November 7 in the four heavily Democratic counties.
Thereafter, only 249 late-received absentee ballots were counted (147
[59%] for Gore). 188 By contrast, nine smaller counties with only
980,000 total votes on November 7 counted an additional 1600 latereceived absentee ballots (1150 [7 1%] for Bush).189 Although some of
this difference may be attributed to a disproportionate number of
overseas military personnel in these smaller counties, it appears that a
substantially smaller percentage of late-received absentee ballots were
accepted in the heavily Democratic counties. 190
Some ballots that were disqualified in Palm Beach, Miami-Dade,
Volusia, or Broward Counties may have been valid ballots under a
proper reading of the applicable law as explained later by Judge Collier.
If the failure to count these absentee ballots cost Gore net votes,
responsibility must lie with the Gore legal team. This same reasoning
applies to the possibility that potentially illegal ballots 19 1 were counted
in the Republican counties. At least fourteen counties initially rejected
the Bush team's legal position, to the extent that the Bush team found it
necessary to file suit against the counties. The Gore legal team failed to

187. Those counties are Broward, Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, and Volusia.
188. See the official results as shown on the NORC Website, supra note 2.
189. The counties are Bay, Brevard, Clay, Duval, Escambia, Manatee, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa,
and Seminole. See the official results as shown on the NORC Website, supra note 2. Eight of
these nine counties had initially resisted the Bush team's demands and had been the target of the
Republican lawsuits over late-received absentee ballots. These nine counties provided Bush with
1150 votes from late-received absentee ballots and a net advantage of 700 votes over Gore.
190. See Barstow & Van Natta, supra note 8 (indicating that Gore counties accepted only two
of ten ballots lacking evidence of mailing on or before Election Day; with Bush counties

accepting six of ten such ballots).
191. One writer has suggested that the Bush legal team discussed the "drumming up of illegal
post-election ballots." See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 301.
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come to the aid of these county canvassing boards. 19 2 If, as a result,
Bush gained an undue advantage that possibly gave him his margin of
victory, responsibility lies with the Gore legal team's strategy, not the
Bush legal team.
The ultimate benefits for Bush were great. Of the total of 2491 latereceived ballots accepted, counted, and included in the results certified
on November 26, Bush received 1575 votes-for a net gain over Gore
of 739 votes. 19 3 This net gain more than offset any additional votes
achieved by Gore through the recounts completed prior to certification.
Even as the United States Supreme Court was bringing the post-election
legal battle to a close on December 12, Bush was poised to potentially
pick up a few more net votes from late-received ballots to be accepted
and counted in the six counties directly affected by Judge Collier's
order.
L

Uncounted Overvotes

The NORC review of uncounted ballots in Florida shows that perhaps
Gore's best opportunity to win in the post-election dispute was by
obtaining a manual counting of overvotes, particularly in counties
using optical scan counting equipment. 194 Altogether there were
approximately 114,000 ballots statewide classified in 2000 as invalid
overvotes. 19 5 Upon manual review of these ballots, NORC coders
identified 3501 ballots that clearly exhibited a voter preference for a
single candidate. The most common scenario in which this occurred
was on optical scan ballots on which the voter had blackened the oval
for a single candidate, but had also entered the candidate's name as a
write-in. 196 Such ballots with clearly ascertainable voter intent are valid
votes under Florida law and must be counted. NORC identified Gore as
the candidate selected on 2194 of these uncounted
overvote ballots
197
statewide, with a net gain for Gore of 887 votes.

192. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 297 (indicating that the Gore legal team did not oppose the
Bush team on the absentee ballot issue either in court or before the canvassing boards).
193. See Official Results, supra note 3.
194. See Kane, supra note 9; see also supra notes 9, 98 and accompanying text (reviewing the
reasons for the rejection of overvotes by the voting device).
195. NORC was able to review 113,820 of these overvote ballots. See NORC Website supra
note 2; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the Florida Ballots Project and
the process by which uncounted ballots were reviewed).
196. Kane, supra note 9. NORC coders also found punch-card ballots with clean punches for
a single candidate that apparently had been misinterpreted by the counting machines as overvotes.
Id.
197. Id.; NORC Website, supra note 2.

2002]

Post-Election Legal Strategy in Florida

Members of the Gore legal team indicate that they never focused
specifically on the possibility of a net gain by Gore from the manual
review of overvotes statewide.1 98 It was the Bush legal team, in fact,
that pointed to the existence of such overvotes and claimed that the
manual review of only undervotes would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
One reason that dissuaded the Gore legal team from seeking a
statewide recount of ballots, which in hindsight might have disclosed
these valid overvote ballots, was concern that the canvassing boards in
the remaining sixty-three counties might be hostile and unwilling to
manually review ballots. This concern appears to have been misplaced.
The NORC review found that its coders were in "high agreement" on
the coding of overvote ballots. 199 In other words, the disputes about
voter intent that plagued both the Florida canvassing boards and the
NORC coders when considering undervote ballots, particularly in
counties using punch cards, were not present with the review of
overvote ballots, particularly in optical scan counties. Moreover, when
Gore legal team members did seek manual reviews of ballots in optical
scan counties, such as Volusia and Gadsden Counties, the county
canvassing boards and election officials acquiesced, with the result that
the hand-counting in those two counties proceeded relatively smoothly
and garnered Gore valuable net votes.
Whether the Gore legal team should have specifically recognized the
potential of adding net votes for Gore through the counting of overvote
ballots may be problematic. However, the team's failure to request the
manual review and counting of all ballots classified as nonvotes
statewide, including overvotes, was a significant mistake. Ironically,
the Bush legal team's strategy of arguing that counting only undervotes
is a denial of equal protection could have proven disastrous for Bush if
the scope of the recount had been timely expanded to include these
ballots.
J. Gore Election Contest
The Gore election contest petition was filed on November 27,
2000. 20 0 Apparently, the petition went through many different versions
before being filed, as the Gore legal team determined what allegations

198.
199.
200.
Bush v.

Interview with John Newton, Al Gore attorney, in Tallahasse, Fla. (Jan. 30, 2002).
NORC Website, supra note 2.
See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'd per curiamsub nom.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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should be included. 20 1 Among the potential allegations that did not find
their way into the final complaint were those challenging: (1) the
butterfly ballot in Palm Beach County; (2) the voter instructions and
caterpillar ballot in Duval County; (3) the inclusion in the final returns
of potentially illegal late-received absentee ballots in certain counties;
(4) the inclusion in the final returns of potentially illegal absentee
ballots in Martin and Seminole Counties; (5) the exclusion from the
final returns of approximately 26,000 uncounted ballots in Duval
County; (6) the exclusion from the final returns of legal overvotes
statewide; and (7) the exclusion from the final returns of legal
undervotes statewide.20 2None of these allegations ultimately found their
way into the petition.
The reality facing the Gore legal team on November 27 was that very
little time remained 20 3 in which to obtain any relief that could change
the election. Therefore, Gore's contest complaint essentially followed
the team's strategy since November 9-i.e., manually review and handcount all undervotes 204 in Volusia, Broward, Palm Beach and MiamiDade Counties. The manual recounts had been timely completed in
Volusia and Broward Counties, and the recount totals were part of the
final returns certified by Secretary of State Harris. Therefore, the
complaint under section 102.168 focused on Palm Beach and MiamiDade Counties. 2 05 Gore, however, had to prevail on20 6essentially all of
his claims to overtake Bush's lead using this strategy.
In regard to Palm Beach County, Gore alleged that the failure of the
Secretary of State to include the results of the county's manual recount
(a net gain of 215 votes 207 for Gore) was an unlawful exclusion of legal
201. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 196-202; Interview with John Newton, Al Gore attorney,
in Tallahasse, Fla. (Jan. 30, 2002) (describing how the draft petition was changed periodically in
response to decisions being made by the legal team leadership in conjunction with Gore on a
conference call).
202. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 196-202.
203. Throughout the election contest process, the Gore team took the position in
oral arguments and in written pleadings that "December 12, 2000 [is the] deadline for the
resolution of contests regarding the selection of electors." Compl. to Contest Election, supra note
10, at 6.
204. At least some overvotes were counted in Volusia, Broward, and Miami-Dade Counties
during the administrative recount. Interview with Jack Young, Al Gore attorney, in Washington,
D.C. (May 27, 2002).
205. Compl. to Contest Election, supra note 10, at 19-20. The complaint also alleged that the
canvassing board of Nassau County on November 24 had unlawfully substituted the county's
original vote totals for the results of the automatic recount conducted on November 8. Id. at 11.

The effect was a net loss of fifty-one votes for Gore. Id.
206. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 196-202.
207. The accuracy of this number was disputed in the filings of the Bush legal team, which
insisted that the correct number was only 176 net votes for Gore. Defs. George W. Bush & Dick
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votes. 20 8 At the same time, the Gore complaint also alleged that the
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board had applied an unlawfully
restrictive standard of counting only ballots with a "hanging chad"
during its manual recount and, therefore, had unlawfully excluded
approximately 4000 legal votes, 209 with a loss to Gore of approximately
800 net votes. In regard to Miami-Dade County, the Gore complaint
alleged that the Secretary of State's failure to include the results of the
county's partial recount, a net gain for Gore of 168 votes from the
manual counting of 20% of the county's precincts, was an unlawful
exclusion of legal votes. 2 10 The complaint also alleged that the county
canvassing board had acted unlawfully to exclude votes by failing to
complete its manual recount, with the result that approximately 9000
undervote ballots remained to be reviewed. 2 1 1 Gore asserted that, if he
received the same proportion of the legal votes from among these 9000
ballots as from among those
already reviewed, he would gain a net of
2 12
approximately 600 votes.
The responses of the Bush legal team, the other defendants, and
intervenors opposing Gore have received less attention. The Bush team
split its briefing efforts among several groups of lawyers, with the result
that in last days of November 2000 the team filed multiple motions and
memoranda of law calling for rejection of Gore's claims and dismissal
of the election contest complaint. Altogether, Bush raised at least
eighteen separate affirmative defenses, including claims that: (1) Gore
lacked standing because section 102.168 applied only to qualified
electors and losing "candidates" (i.e., the presidential electors); (2) the
court lacked jurisdiction because the contest complaint had been filed
after the prescribed statutory deadline; (3) the election contest
provisions of Florida law were not intended to apply to presidential
elections; (4) the canvassing boards of Palm Beach and Miami-Dade
Counties did not abuse their discretion; and (5) the recount and contest
processes in Florida violated constitutional due process and equal

Cheney's Offer of Proof Regarding Palm Beach County Manual Recount Results at 1, Gore v.
Harris, No. CV-00-2808 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000), available at http://199.44.225.4/
courtDockets/pdf/election cases/CV-00-2808-26.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2002).
208. Compl. to Contest Election, supra note 10, at 19-20.
209. Id. On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, this number was corrected to 3300 ballots.
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
210. Compl. to Contest Election, supra note 10, at 3.
211. Id. at4.
212. Id.
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protection and other provisions of federal law. 2 13 Secretary of State
Harris's defense pleadings stressed the additional argument that the
Gore complaint was 2 inadequate
because it did not initiate a recount of
14
all ballots statewide.
Especially interesting, as it relates to the potential outcome of any
eventual effort by the court to have actually resolved the election by
counting all legal votes and excluding all illegal votes, are the
Republican challenges to: (1) the recount results in Broward, Volusia
and Pinellas Counties 2 15 (which had resulted in a net gain for Gore of
1130 votes) 2 16 on the basis that the canvassing boards "included

numerous illegal votes for the Democratic Presidential Electors"; 2 17 and
(2) the exclusion in some counties of legal votes from late-received
overseas absentee ballots. 2 18 Further, the Bush team alleged that the
9000 uncounted ballots from Miami-Dade had been mishandled in
violation of state law, with the result that chads had been dislodged and
the ballots spoiled. 2 19 Bush claimed that, as a result, the integrity of the
9000 ballots had been compromised, with the effect that the ballots
could not legally be introduced into evidence. 2 2 In other words, the
Bush team was prepared to fight over each potential net vote and
to try
to counter any added Gore votes with additional net Bush votes. 22 1

213. Answer & Affirmative Defenses of Defs. George W. Bush & Dick Cheney at 12-13,
Gore v. Harris, No. CV-00-2808 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000), available at
http://l199.44.225.4/courtDockets/pdf/electioncases/CV-00-2808ar.pdf
(last visited Nov. 23,
2002) [hereinafter Defs' Answer & Affirmative Defenses].
214. Answer & Defenses of Katherine Hanis, as Sec'y of State, & Sec'y of Agric. Bob
Crawford, Sec'y of State Katherine Harris, & L. Clayton Roberts, Dir., Div. of Elections,
Individually & as Members of & as the Fla. Elections Canvassing Comm'n at 28, Gore v. Harris,
No. CV-00-2808 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000), available at http://199.44.225.4/courtDockets/
pdf/electioncases/CV-00-2808am.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2002).
215. In the automatic recount conducted by Pinellas County on November 8, the County
added 404 votes for Gore and subtracted sixty-one for Bush, giving Gore a net gain of 465 votes.
See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 85. Bush disputed this change.
216. This total represents the sum of votes netted for Gore in Volusia (98), Broward (567),
and Pinellas (465) Counties.
217. Bush filed a third party complaint against these counties. Third Party Compl. of Defs.
George W. Bush & Dick Cheney at 18-19, Gore v. Harris, No. CV-00-2808 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4,
2000), available at http://199.44.225.4/courtDockets/pdf/election-cases/CV-00-2808bs.pdf (last
visited Nov. 23, 2002).
218. Defs' Answer & Affirmative Defenses, supra note 213, at 13.
219. Id. at 19.
220. Id. at 19-20.
221. The Miami Herald has suggested that Bush also could have challenged thousands of
illegal votes cast by felons or unregistered voters, including 473 alleged illegal votes in MiamiDade County. See METZER, supra note 15, at 8, 104 (estimating that as many as 2500 felons
statewide were allowed to vote).
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The legal and factual issues raised in the election contest pleadings
were numerous, significant, and complex. The potential for new legal
and factual issues was almost endless. Nevertheless, as pointed out by
the Bush legal team, the purpose of an election contest is to declare a
winner and "[i]n order to determine a winner, the Court must resolve all
contested issues concerning the November 7 election." 22 2 Obviously,
Republicans were pleased that it appeared very unlikely that sufficient
time existed for litigation of the myriad of issues raised in the contest
proceeding.
The Election Contest Proceeding. The Gore legal team's strategy at
trial of Gore's election contest was dictated by the perceived need to
meet a "December 12, 2000 deadline for the resolution of contests
regarding the selection of electors.' ' 223 Time was rapidly running out.
Therefore, the legal team decided to focus less on presenting a strong
evidentiary case at trial than on accelerating the case through the circuit
court 224 to the Florida Supreme Court. David Boies took the lead in
implementing this strategy.
Given the acute shortage of time remaining before the perceived
December 12 deadline, the decision by the Gore legal team to avoid a
lengthy evidentiary trial at the circuit court was a necessary one.
Nevertheless, several aspects of the trial would later adversely affect
whatever chance still existed for Gore to prevail in the election.
First, the Gore legal team overlooked the threshold burden
that separates an administrative recount from an election contest.
Section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes appears deceptively simple.
This statute, as amended in 1999, expressly acknowledges that the
"rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in
doubt the result of the election"22 5 is a ground for an election contest
and authorizes the circuit court judge to fashion such orders as he or she
deems necessary. 226 There is no express indication of any threshold
burden to be met by the plaintiff. It would seem reasonable, based on
the face of this statute alone, to expect in a close election that the trial
court would simply begin to look for valid votes among those ballots

222. Id.
223. Compl. to Contest Election, supra note 10, at 6.
224. Some Democratic attorneys urge that virtually any circuit judge in Leon County other
than Judge Sanders Saul would have granted Gore his requested relief. Interview with John
Newton, Al Gore attorney, in Tallahasse, Fla. (Jan. 30, 2002). These attorneys suggest that the
failure to disqualify Judge Sauls from hearing the election contest was a major tactical mistake.
Id.
225. FLA. STAT. ch. 102.168(3)(c) (2000).
226. See id. ch. 102.168(7).
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that had remained uncounted or possibly to count de novo
those disputed ballots that had been counted or rejected by
the canvassing boards. The apparent promise of section 102.168,
however, was illusory. The threshold burden was there but unspoken
and apparently unseen. The Gore team's failure to meet this threshold
burden would doom its contest effort.
Second, the Gore team presented no evidence that the canvassing
board of Palm Beach County had excluded legal votes by refusing to
count the votes allegedly existing on the 3300 ballots that had "dimples"
instead of "detached chad." As the Florida Supreme Court later found,
although review by a court in an election contest proceeding is de novo,
a court is not required to repeat an otherwise-proper manual count of
ballots. 22 7 Therefore, a plaintiff has the burden of introducing evidence
to refute or call into question the canvassing board's determinations.
The Gore team relied on the existence in the court record of the ballots
themselves and the transcripts of the Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board. The Supreme Court of Florida found that Gore "failed to make a
threshold showing that 'legal votes' were rejected." 22 8 The outcome on
this issue before the Florida Supreme Court was crucial because the
3300 votes in question represented a net gain for Gore of approximately
800 votes. Without these votes, Gore was doomed to be defeated
without a statewide counting of overvotes.
Third, Gore's claim at trial that reviewing the 9000 uncounted ballots
in Miami-Dade County would produce an additional 600 net votes for
Gore was plainly unsupportable. 22 9 Gore's net gain of 168 votes from
the partial recount in Miami-Dade County had come with reviewing
ballots from the most heavily Democratic precincts (voting 75% for
Gore) in the county. Gore claimed at trial that he would realize a net
gain of an additional 600 votes through a manual review of the
remaining 9000 undervote ballots in the county. This claim, however,
rested on the assumption that Gore would continue to receive the same
proportion of votes in the remaining uncounted precincts even though
those precincts had gone 52% for Bush. Republican witness Dr.

227. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'd per curiam sub noma.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
228. See id. (per curiam) (indicating that "[the appellants... failed to introduce any evidence
to refute the Canvassing Board's determination that the 3300 ballots did not constitute 'legal
votes"'); see also TAPPER, supra note 13, at 376 (indicating that Boies decided not to attempt on
the cross examination of Palm Beach County Judge Burton to undermine the Palm Beach County
standard as too rigid).
229. A legitimate question is why the Gore legal team proceeded with this claim (even making
it the focus of the team's efforts) in view of its apparent weakness.
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Laurentius Marais persuasively testified that the projection of a gain for
Gore from any review of the uncounted 9000 ballots was "unreliable
and inaccurate." 23231
0 Subsequent reviews of these ballots confirm Dr.

Marais's opinion.

Fourth, Gore's strategy during the recount phase of manually
recounting only in selected counties may have been an available remedy
at the recount stage, but it was legally insufficient to sustain an election
contest. By adhering to this strategy in the election contest complaint,
the Gore legal team was unable to demonstrate how, in fact, a vote
change in only those counties (regardless how substantial) would
change or place in doubt the outcome of the election statewide. The
majority opinion of the Florida Supreme Court tried to save the Gore
legal team from its failed legal strategy by finding that Gore had met his

burden under section 102.168, but the majority opinion also recognized
that uncounted ballots
needed to be reviewed statewide, not just in
232
selected counties.
K. The Republican Foray Into FederalCourt
Although the final outcome before the United States Supreme Court
was favorable for Bush, the federal lawsuit filed in Florida on behalf of
Bush was unsuccessful. It is important to understand how these two
legal actions were different in the issues that they raised.
The Bush legal team filed an omnibus complaint, Siegel v. LePore,
on behalf of Bush and Cheney in the federal court for the Northern
District of Florida. 233 Republican residents of counties in Florida in
230. Contest Hearing Record at 326-27, Gore v. Harris, CV-00-2808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000), available at http://199.44.225.4/courtDockets/pdf/electioncases/CV-00-2808-38.pdf (last
visited Nov. 23, 2002).
231. See Keating & Balz, supra note 9 (indicating that, based on the NORC study, if the
undervotes in Miami-Dade County had been counted and added to the votes from the other three
recounted counties, as sought in Gore's election contest complaint, Bush would have prevailed in
the election by approximately 225 votes).
232. Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1253 (per curiam) (observing "[w]e do agree ...that it is absolutely
essential in this proceeding and to any final decision, that a manual recount be conducted for all
legal votes ... in all Florida counties where there was an undervote and, hence, a concern that not
every citizen's vote was counted"). The three dissenting members of the court concluded that
Gore had failed to carry his burden even in regard to Miami-Dade County. Id. at 1263 (Wells,
C.J, dissenting); see id. at 1271 (Harding, J., dissenting).
233. Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla.), affd, 234 F.3d 1163 (11 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1005 (2000) [hereinafter Siegel 1]. The Republicans attempted to use this
federal court as a means of dealing with many of the various issues surrounding the November 7
election. For example, the plaintiffs sought to stop the manual recounts, to declare Florida
Statutes section 102.166(4) unconstitutional, to declare the form of the ballot in Palm Beach
County to have been valid, and to remove and consolidate any other actions filed across the State
of Florida purporting to challenge the November 7 election or to delay the certification of the
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which the ballots were not being manually recounted joined them in the
action. Bush challenged Florida's manual recount system on the basis
that it lacked meaningful standards for determining voter intent, thereby
allowing similar ballots (particularly those with dimpled chads) to be
counted differently in different counties. Bush argued that the effect
was a violation of due process (i.e., lack of standards) and equal
protection (i.e., that a voter has a right to have her ballot counted in the
same manner as other ballots are counted in other counties). The
individual voters added the equal protection argument that their votes
were less likely to be counted than votes in counties in which ballots
were being recounted (i.e., all ballots should be recounted, or none
should be recounted) 2 34 and that, therefore, such recounts should be
either prohibited or required to be statewide.
Federal District Judge Donald Middlebrooks rejected the plaintiffs'
request for an injunction to stop the ongoing manual recounts. 235 Judge
Middlebrooks concluded that there had been no showing of irreparable
harm given the preliminary stage of the post-election process and the
availability to Bush of an election contest to resolve any voting
irregularities. 236 He rejected the equal protection and due process
claims on the basis that manual recounts are used across the country and
serve a valuable function, along with the decentralized election system
to prevent corruption and fraud in elections. 23 7 Judge Middlebrooks
warned that federal courts should tread cautiously in the traditional state
province of electoral procedures and tabulations. 238 A separate group of
Republican voters also filed suit challenging the manual recounts. This
suit also was
dismissed based on the reasoning in Judge Middlebrooks's
23 9
opinion.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied the request for
an emergency motion for injunction pending appeal. 240 The United
election. See Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1169-70 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1005
(2000) [hereinafter Siegel 11].
234. Siegel ], 234 F.3d at 1174-75.
235. Siegel!, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
236. Id. at 1052-53.
237. Id. at 1050-52.
238. Id. at 1052-54.
239. Touchston v. McDermott, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (M.D. Fla.), affd, 234 F.3d 1133 (11th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1061 (2001) [hereinafter Touchston 1].
240. Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1061
(2001) [hereinafter Touchston II] (the court noted that Florida laws provided a detailed election
dispute process both in the form of administrative actions by state officials and actions in state
courts that could address and resolve any necessary federal constitutional issues presented to
them). The same conclusion was reached in the emergency appeal in Siegel v. LePore. Siegel II,
234 F.3d at 1177.
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States Supreme Court denied certiorari even before the case was
decided by the court of appeals. 241 On December 6, the Eleventh
Circuit en banc upheld Judge Middlebrooks's ruling without reaching
the merits of the plaintiffs' challenges. 24 2 Four justices dissented. The
foray into federal court by the Bush legal team had been unsuccessful.
A crucial difference exists in the issues raised by the Republican
plaintiffs in Siegel and those that came before the United States
Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore. In Siegel, the plaintiffs were
challenging the Florida statutory structure that provided for manual
recounts and the process of administrative actions and state court
actions designed to resolve election disputes. The Florida structures and
process are very similar to those existing in other states nationwide.
Therefore, any ruling that the Florida statutes or the manual recount
process were unconstitutional unavoidably would have called into
question the validity of the laws and election procedures in many other
states and propelled the federal courts headlong into a major intrusion
into state management of elections. No federal court, including the
United States Supreme Court, is likely to welcome such a global result.
Through its flawed strategy of attempting to continue the limited
manual recount in its election contest, however, the Gore legal team
created the opportunity needed by Republicans to successfully
challenge the outcome in Florida without creating a precedent with
broad implications. The Florida Supreme Court attempted to save Gore
from his flawed strategy by remanding
the election contest for a
243
statewide recount of undervotes.
In doing so, however, the Florida
Court realized the shortage of time remaining to resolve the recount
and, therefore, mandated the inclusion of recount totals in Palm Beach
and Miami-Dade Counties that otherwise would have been subject to
challenge by Bush in the election contest. Republicans were left
without an effective recourse by which to challenge these or other
disputed vote totals within the expedited election contest process. The
Florida Court went on to prescribe an essentially nonuniform manner of
counting the remaining ballots in the time available. The court's
majority opinion was a product of extraordinary circumstances and
recognized that "practical difficulties may well end up controlling the
241. Siegel v. LePore, 531 U.S. 1005 (2000) (denying appellants' writ of certiorari before
judgment).
242. Siegel H, 234 F.3d at 1178-79 (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by finding that plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing at least a substantial likelihood of
irreparable injury).
243. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla.) (per curiam), rev'd per curiam sub nom.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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outcome of the election. ' 244 The court's order demonstrated that there
no longer was time for the state courts to provide the fundamental
fairness necessary for a credible result in the election contest.
The per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore carefully limits its
precedential significance. The opinion explains the scope of its holding
as follows:
The recount process, in its features here described, is inconsistent
with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental
right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under
the authority of a single state judicial officer. Our consideration is
limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal
protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.
The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the
exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for
implementing elections. Instead, we are presented with a situation
where a state court with the power to assure uniformit24 5has ordered a
statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards.
The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion limits its scope to a remedial
order of a judicial officer having authority to assure uniformity in a
statewide recount. By doing so, the opinion expressly limits itself to
election contest type proceedings and avoids directly implicating state
statutes providing for manual recounts or a process of administrative
actions or state court actions designed to resolve election disputes. In
other words, the opinion avoids the type of issues posed in Siegel.24 6
Read literally, the per curiam opinion holds only that a remedial order
in a judicial election contest proceeding must assure "rudimentary
requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness" 2 47 for
resolving disputes over the counting of votes throughout the election
jurisdiction in question. Nothing is novel in this declaration. A
function of an election contest before a single judicial officer or court,
or other authorized forum, 24 8 is to consider alleged irregularities that
might affect the outcome of the election and to fairly resolve disputes.
For it to be legally acceptable for such a court to resolve those disputes
in an admittedly nonuniform manner with the result favoring one

244. Id. at 1261 n.21 (per curiam).
245. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam).
246. See supra notes 233-42 and accompanying text (discussing the issues posed in Siegel v.
LePore).
247. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam).
248. See Steve Bickerstaff, Counts, Recounts and Election Contests: Lessons From the
Florida PresidentialElection, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 425, 433 (2001) (describing how officials
or forums, such as Congress, may be designated to hear election contests).
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candidate or the other is a shocking concept. Yet, this is the concept
that ultimately was the basis for Gore's election contest strategy.
By pursuing this strategy, the Gore legal team unwittingly gave the
Bush team a bona fide argument for federal court intervention to
terminate a state process that was unable to provide fundamental
fairness for both candidates in the time remaining for adjudication.
Gore's flawed strategy gave the Supreme Court of the United States an
opportunity to resolve the contest for the Presidency of the United
States without establishing a precedent that would necessarily apply to
the statutes and election procedures of Florida or any other state.
L. The Effect of PoliticalConsiderationson Legal Strategy
The Bush and Gore legal teams conducted their legal maneuvering in
a floodlight of media coverage. Both candidates were concerned about
the public perception and political ramifications of each possible legal
strategy. Candidate Gore was concerned about the perceived need to
maintain support among Democratic Party leadership, elected officials
in Congress, and the media if he was to prolong the election dispute in
249
Florida through a recount or litigation.
One effect of the active involvement of Gore and his political
advisors in the decision-making in Florida was that it created an
opportunity for the legal strategy in Florida to be shaped by political
rather than legal concerns. Several specific strategic decisions appear to
have been significantly influenced by political considerations, including
the following: (1) to seek a manual review of ballots in only four
counties instead of statewide (because of the concern that manually
counting ballots in only a handful of counties would be more politically
acceptable than manually counting ballots in all counties); (2) to seek a
delay of the deadline for vote certification rather than proceeding
immediately with a judicial election contest (because of the concern that
litigation would be less politically acceptable); and (3) to avoid
aggressively challenging statewide the counting of late-received
absentee ballots attributable to military personnel (because of the
concern that such opposition would be perceived as "anti-military" and
could have unfavorable political ramifications in the future for Gore and
other Democratic candidates). Each of these decisions possibly cost
Gore the election.

249. See TOOBIN, supra note 15, at 7, 21, 30, 82, 180, 224 (describing how Gore agonized
over the views of the "elite opinion makers" and the "Washington establishment," particularly as
they might be prompted to call for Gore's withdrawal or concession).
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Bush's de facto delegation of responsibility for legal strategy to the
Bush legal team in Florida had the apparent effect of reducing the
impact of political concerns on the determination of Republican legal
strategy. Republican political concerns directly affected how the legal
strategy was packaged for the public more than the strategy itself.
Clearly, the Republicans actively worked to manage the media and to
affect how Americans saw the events and issues in Florida 250 by
sending "the message" that once the automatic recounts were completed
on November 9, the election was over and that any further recounts,
especially by hand, were a partisan attempt to steal the election. There
is no indication, however, that the Bush legal team actually believed
that the uncertified results were legally final; 25 1 nor did this public
position deter the Bush legal team from continuing its efforts to increase
the number of late-received absentee ballots counted by county
canvassing boards through December 12.
The Republicans considered both the Florida courts and canvassing
boards to be dominated by Democrats. 2 52 Therefore, as the Florida
courts became engaged on the election issues, the courts also became
targets of the Republican public
253 relations strategy designed to show that
the election was being stolen.
Accusations by an attorney that a court
system or court is biased or partisan are extraordinary, particularly if the
attorney is directly or indirectly representing clients before those courts.
In hindsight, however, there can be little doubt now that Republican
claims of partisan bias, and resulting media coverage of those claims,
drew the attention of members of the nation's highest court and served
to set the stage for Bush's successful appeal to that Court. Regardless
whether the Republican public relations strategy was part of the larger
legal strategy to reach the United States Supreme Court, it aided
that end strategy. The Republicans' public relations strategy both
effectively communicated the Republican legal and policy positions to
the United States Supreme Court before any case actually reached the
Court and helped prepare the public, nationwide, to accept a decision by
that Court bringing the "partisan" proceedings in Florida to a close.
250. One of Jim Baker's first concerns on arriving in Florida was the need to develop a "PR
strategy." See id. at 46. The strategy of claiming that the election was already over was at least
partly a response by Jim Baker to that need that he perceived. Id. at 48.
251. For some observers, this meant that the Republicans were guilty of hypocrisy. See id. at
48.
252. See id. at 47 (noting that Baker counted the canvassing boards and the courts as warriors

for the Democrats).
253. See TAPPER, supra note 13, at 248-49 (describing Baker's news conference on
November 21, 2000, accusing "[tihe Florida Supreme Court and some Democratic county
electoral boards" of changing the rules in the middle of the game).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Litigators are tempted to believe that they win because of their skills
and lose only when the facts, law, or courts are against them. The truth,
of course, is that sometimes (as we recognize in hindsight) we win
because of good fortune and lose because of our unsuccessful legal
strategies, inadequately prepared witnesses, or the will and capabilities
of the opposing counsel. Legal contests, like wars or battles, sometimes
are won or lost when the outcome is in doubt. The outcome was in
doubt in Florida on November 8. Bush was not predestined to win;
Gore was not predestined to lose. Gore could have won the Presidency.
This Article has examined some of the reasons why Gore did not win.
Concluding that Gore could have won the Presidency does not mean
that Bush did not rightfully win the election in Florida. Legal rules
exist that historically have provided a means for resolving close
elections. The presidential election in Florida was a statistical dead
heat. Nevertheless, as shown by Bush's presence today in the White
House, there usually is a victor and a vanquished even in a statistical
dead heat. That victor in Florida was George W. Bush. His victory was
won by his legal team.
The NORC review shows that Bush almost certainly would still have
won the statewide recount of undervote ballots as initiated by the Leon
County Circuit Court on December 9. 2 54 Therefore, even those
skeptical of the motivation or legal basis for the stay of that recount in
Bush v. Gore should acknowledge that Bush is not President today
solely because of five justices on the United States Supreme Court.
In a contest of wills between two teams of outstanding, strongminded attorneys, as occurred post-election in Florida, there is no blame
attached to defeat. There are, however, pertinent observations to be
made and possible lessons to be learned. The observations and lessons
that I have derived from my analysis are as follows:
Tactical Advantage. Bush enjoyed a meaningful advantage because
the television networks on the night of November 7-8 had mistakenly
projected him as the winner of the vote in Florida and because
throughout the post-election period he successfully maintained a lead in
the unofficial returns from the Florida counties. Although without
official significance, these factors affected the post-election strategies of
both candidates. The factors allowed Bush to adopt a strategy of
opposing or delaying any move by Gore that might change the returns

254. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (concluding that Gore was unlikely to have
prevailed, based upon the findings of the NORC review).
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before certification and of labeling each such move by Gore as an effort
to steal the election. These factors caused the Gore legal team to
fashion its strategies cautiously because of a perceived need to
minimize anticipated criticism that Gore was needlessly prolonging the
uncertainty of the outcome of the election. Ultimately, however, the
advantage enjoyed by Bush from these unofficial symbols of victory
was not determinative of the outcome. Gore had a chance of prevailing
in the official returns and of winning the Presidency.
Leadership. Each legal team included some of the finest lawyers in
Florida and the United States. The Republican leadership, however,
proved superior. James A. Baker's personal presence, experience,
strategic foresight, de facto authority and unflinching commitment to
winning maintained an astonishing degree of discipline among the
numerous elite lawyers and other professionals that made up the Bush
legal team and contributed to the efficiency and effectiveness of that
team. There was no equivalent figure to enforce discipline on the Gore
legal team or to guide the Gore team effectively in accordance with a
winning long-term strategy.
Organization. The Gore election campaign strategy for winning the
election in Florida focused primarily on turning out Democratic voters
in the six most populous and most heavily Democratic counties in the
state. Organization elsewhere in Florida suffered. After the November
7 election, the Gore legal team attempted to establish a statewide
network to counter the pre-existing Republican statewide network. The
Gore team's effort was unsuccessful. Democratic information gathering
statewide was spotty throughout the post-election process. Potential net
Gore votes went undiscovered or were ignored. The Republican
network of attorneys in each county proved to be a more reliable and
timely source of information for the Bush headquarters and a more
effective means of carrying out Bush strategy statewide. This statewide
network proved particularly important to the outcome in Florida by
convincing county canvassing boards to accept and to count latereceived absentee ballots that did not strictly comply with state law.
Ultimately the Bush legal team was larger, better organized and more
disciplined in support of seeing that its candidate would win.
Inflexible Strategy. The Gore legal team's strategy of requesting
manual recounts in only four of Florida's sixty-seven counties was a
critical error. Perhaps more significant, however, was the team's failure
to modify or abandon this strategy in the face of increasingly ominous
indications that the strategy had backfired and could not win the
election for Gore.
Other possible strategies, both offensive and
defensive, went unimplemented. The goal of completing these four

2002]

Post-Election Legal Strategy in Florida

recounts continued to dominate the focus and organization of the Gore
legal team right up through trial of the election contest. The leadership
of the Gore team proved unable to adjust its strategy for winning in the
face of new information and changed circumstances statewide. By
contrast, the Bush legal team modified its strategies numerous times in
response to changed circumstances, particularly as related to the
counting of late-received absentee ballots and to challenges in federal
court.
Costly Victories. The Gore team succeeded in initiating a manual
recount in all four of the target counties, in securing an inclusive
standard for voter intent in three of the counties and in timely
completing manual recounts in two of the counties for a net gain of 665
votes for Gore. These successes came over vigorous Republican
opposition. The members of the Gore team with the greatest experience
in election recounts were sent to these individual counties to achieve the
recounts. As a result, Gore's recount experts were drawn into almost
daily trench warfare within each county over a mere handful of votes.
The dispersal of the team's experts among the recount counties meant
that they were not present in the Tallahassee headquarters to evaluate
information statewide, to monitor Bush's activities in the other sixtythree counties, to implement alternatives to the limited recount that was
underway or to help modify Gore's election contest strategy as
circumstances changed.
UnfamiliarLaw. Election recount and contest law is arcane. Only a
few attorneys nationwide can legitimately claim to be expert. It is not
wise for attorneys accustomed to practicing in other areas of the law to
try to learn election law in the course of a chaotic, break-neck postelection legal battle. Although the Gore legal team had election law
expertise at least equivalent to the Bush legal team, the Gore team
squandered that expertise. The Gore team leadership too often failed to
follow the advice of its election law experts or its experienced Florida
lawyers or even to timely seek advice from these lawyers. It is not
surprising, therefore, that many of the Gore team's critical legal
strategies backfired. Greater attention to and input from the expert
members of the legal team, in lieu of the more political members, might
have helped the Gore team to better foresee how the recount would
develop and to avoid some of the critical strategic mistakes that
ultimately doomed the recount and election contest efforts and created
the legal justification for the Supreme Court's intervention.
Political Factors. Bush effectively delegated authority to James
Baker to do what was necessary to win the post-election legal battle
in Florida. Baker pursued this objective relentlessly. As a result,
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Republican political concerns more directly affected how a legal
strategy was packaged for the public than the strategy itself. By
contrast, Gore and his political advisors maintained an intense personal
interest in day-to-day events in Florida and in the perceived possibility
of criticism from members of Congress, the press, and the public
for Gore's legal maneuvers. Gore and his political advisors often
participated directly in the formulation of legal strategy. As a result,
Democratic political concerns directly affected legal strategies and
produced a cautious, shortsighted, and uncertain approach in Gore's
post-election battle to win the Presidency.
The Vagaries of Fortune. Despite the circumstances that benefited
the Bush legal team in Florida, the post-election legal battle could have
gone against it. The unanimous decision of the Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board to apply a narrow standard for determining voter
intent cost Gore approximately 800 net votes at a time during the
recount when that vote increase would have given Gore a lead over
Bush at the time the official results were to be certified. Yet, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that the Board's decision was a result of
superior lawyering by the Bush team. Moreover, the Bush team's foray
into federal court to prevent the manual recounts was unsuccessful both
at the district court and court of appeals levels. The opportunity for a
Republican victory before the United States Supreme Court in Bush v.
Gore came not as a result of the Bush team's federal court challenge to
manual recounts, but as a result of the Gore team's flawed election
contest strategy, which led, in the frantic rush of events, to a
fundamentally unfair Florida Supreme Court order.
Neither Gore nor Bush was ever likely to prevail in a judicial contest
of the certified election results because there was never sufficient time
to adjudicate a fair and credible result in the time available after the
November 7 election. Whoever was ahead when the election results
were certified was almost certain to be the winner of Florida's electors
and the Presidency. Gore could have achieved enough net votes to have
been leading at the time of certification. The Bush legal team out
maneuvered the Gore team during the recount phase, however, and won
enough of the issues in the county-by-county recount fights for its
candidate to prevail in the final election returns and to become President
of the United States.

